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ABSTRACT
This article proposes a formal model that integrates cognitive and psychodynamic
psychotherapeutic models of psychopathy to show how two major psychopathic traits called
lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing can be understood as a form of abnormal Bayesian
inference about the self. This model draws on the predictive coding (i.e., active inference)
framework, a neurobiologically plausible explanatory framework for message passing in the
brain that is formalized in terms of hierarchical Bayesian inference. In summary, this model
proposes that these two cardinal psychopathic traits reﬂect entrenched maladaptive Bayesian
inferences about the self, which defend against the experience of deep-seated, self-related
negative emotions, speciﬁcally shame and worthlessness. Support for the model in extant
research on the neurobiology of psychopathy and quantitative simulations are provided.
Finally, we offer a preliminary overview of a novel treatment for psychopathy that rests on
our Bayesian formulation.
INTRODUCTION
Patients with psychopathic personality traits are clinically complex and challenging to treat.
Although there is growing evidence that psychopathic traits can improve, albeit modestly,
over time throughout adulthood (Bergstrøm, Forth, & Farrington, 2015; Black, Baumgard, &
Bell, 1995; Harpur & Hare, 1994; Ullrich & Coid, 2009), robust evidence for effective psy-
chotherapeutic or pharmacological treatments remains elusive (D’Silva, Duggan, & McCarthy,
2004; Gibbon et al., 2010; Harris & Rice, 2006; Khalifa et al., 2010; Polaschek & Daly, 2013;
Reidy, Kearns, & DeGue, 2013; Salekin, 2002; Salekin, Worley, & Grimes, 2010). More-
over, psychopathy is a chronic disturbance, with stable trajectories across developmental
periods and origins in externalizing problems (e.g., conduct disorder) and temperamental dis-
turbances (e.g., callous/unemotional traits) in childhood and adolescence (Black, 2015; Frick,
Ray, Thornton, & Kahn, 2014; Hare, Neumann, & Widiger, 2012; Mofﬁtt, 1993). In addition
to this stability, another factor that makes psychopathy a treatment challenge is that it is one
of the strongest predictors of violent and criminal behavior (Andrews & Bonta, 2010a, 2010b;
Bonta, Blais, &Wilson, 2014; Bonta, Law, & Hanson, 1998; Gendreau, Little, & Goggin, 1996;
Leistico, Salekin, DeCoster, & Rogers, 2008; R. Yu, Geddes, & Fazel, 2012). This means that
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patients with this personality disorder require complex management strategies to ensure the
safety of clinical teams and the public, while facilitating patient rehabilitation and recovery.
These clinical challenges are compounded by the fact that psychopathy is associated
with an immense socioeconomic burden and high prevalence. Estimates of the societal costs
of psychopathy far exceed the annual costs of alcohol/substance abuse, obesity, smoking,
and schizophrenia (Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011). Psychopathy affects approximately 1% of the
general population (Coid, Yang, Ullrich, Roberts, & Hare, 2009; Neumann & Hare, 2008;
Torgersen, 2012), which is comparable to schizophrenia (Messias, Chen, & Eaton, 2007). Ap-
proximately 4%–8% of the psychiatric population and 15%–25% of the correctional popula-
tion are affected by psychopathy (Hare, 2003; Skeem & Mulvey, 2001; Torgersen, 2012). The
high prevalence and substantial socioeconomic burden mean that understanding the etiology
of psychopathy is a pressing scientiﬁc priority.
This article offers a formal explanation of the pathogenesis of two major psychopathic
personality traits—lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing—in terms of active Bayesian inference.
Our formulation draws on one of the most inﬂuential neurobiologically plausible explanatory
frameworks for message passing in the brain: predictive coding. Predictive coding treats the
brain as a hierarchical Bayesian inference machine (Friston, 2010; Friston, Stephan, Montague,
& Dolan, 2014). This article thus builds on the growing recognition of predictive coding as
the framework for understanding the etiology of various psychopathologies (Corlett & Fletcher,
2014; Friston, Stephan et al., 2014; Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan, 2012; Prosser, Helfer,
& Leucht, 2016). The predictive coding framework has provided neurobiologically plausible
computational models of the etiology of delusions, hallucinations, functional (“hysterical”)
symptoms, depression, and autism in terms of abnormal Bayesian inferences (Adams, Stephan,
Brown, Frith, & Friston, 2013; Chekroud, 2015; Edwards, Adams, Brown, Pareés, & Friston,
2012; Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012). This work holds promise to help
clinicians and researchers understand the etiology—and thus treatment—of these major psy-
chopathologies. Although inference about oneself has been considered (Moutoussis, Fearon,
El-Deredy, Dolan, & Friston, 2014), to date, there has be no formal application of predictive
coding to understanding the etiology of psychopathy.
The ﬁrst section of the article reviews the construct of psychopathy and justiﬁes our focus
on these two key traits. The second section reviews the commonalities between cognitive and
psychodynamic etiological models of psychopathy from the psychotherapeutic literature. We
then describe a Bayesian model of psychopathy and provide quantitative simulations of this
model. Furthermore, we show how this model is supported by research on the neurobiology of
psychopathy. In the ﬁnal section, we outline potential treatment implications of the Bayesian
model. Our framework integrates cognitive and psychodynamic psychotherapeutic models
to show how lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing can be modeled as a form of abnormal
Bayesian inference leading to false beliefs about the self. In brief, these traits reﬂect entrenched
maladaptive Bayesian inferences about the self, which defend against the conscious experience
of deep-seated self-related negative emotions, speciﬁcally, shame and worthlessness.
THE CONSTRUCT OF PSYCHOPATHY
Before providing an operational deﬁnition of psychopathy, we ﬁrst need be clear about what
is meant by a personality disorder (PD), based on the current empirical understanding of the
nature and structure of PD, because psychopathy is a particular kind of PD. The general cri-
teria for PD in Section II of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th
edition (DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) retains the original DSM–IV
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deﬁnition (APA, 1994). It deﬁnes PD as an enduring, pervasive, and inﬂexible pattern of inner
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s cul-
ture (APA, 2013). This pattern of disturbance is manifested in ways the patient perceives and
interprets their self, others, and events; the range, intensity, lability, and appropriateness of their
emotional responses; and their interpersonal functioning and impulse control. Furthermore,
a PD leads to clinically signiﬁcant distress or impairment and has a stable and long duration
whose onset can be traced back to at least adolescence or early adulthood. Furthermore,
because the DSM–5 Section II PD model is a categorical diagnostic system, it classiﬁes per-
sonality pathology into 10 distinct disorders grouped into three clusters: Cluster A (paranoid,
schizoid, schizotypal), Cluster B (antisocial, borderline, histrionic, narcissistic), and Cluster C
(avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive).
The DSM–5 Section II general criteria of PD have been extensively criticized over the
years because they suffer from signiﬁcant conceptual and empirical problems (Livesley, 1998;
Livesley & Jang, 2000; Morey, Bender, & Skodol, 2013; Morey et al., 2011; Parker et al., 2002;
Skodol, Bender et al., 2011; Skodol, Clark et al., 2011). First, these criteria are nonspeciﬁc
to PD, because many other mental disorders meet some or all of the criteria. Second, there
is no empirical basis for these general criteria. Furthermore, there is very little validity to the
DSM–5 Section II categorical model. Problems with this model are well documented and
manifold and will not be reviewed here. However, the major issues are (a) excessive between-
category, between-cluster, and within-cluster comorbidity; (b) extreme clinical heterogeneity
within diagnostic categories; (c) arbitrary diagnostic thresholds that do not adequately index
severity; (d) inadequate coverage of the full range of personality pathology; (e) limited clinical
utility; (f) no evidence for the existence of the discrete PD categories; (g) limited convergent
validity; (h) temporal instability; and (i) inadequate diagnostic reliability (Cooper & Balsis,
2009; De Fruyt et al., 2013; Johansen, Karterud, Pedersen, Gude, & Falkum, 2004; Kotov
et al., 2017; Lenzenweger, Lane, Loranger, & Kessler, 2007; Markon, Krueger, & Watson,
2005; Morey, Benson, Busch, & Skodol, 2015; Morey, Krueger, & Skodol, 2013; Quilty,
Ayearst, Chmielewski, Pollock, & Bagby, 2013; Sheets & Craighead, 2007; Skodol et al., 2002;
Trull, Scheiderer, & Tomko, 2012; Van den Broeck et al., 2014; Verheul & Widiger, 2004;
Watson, Stasik, Ro, & Clark, 2013; Wright et al., 2012; Wright & Simms, 2014; Zimmerman,
Rothschild, & Chelminski, 2005; Zimmermann et al., 2014).
For these reasons, an alternative, empirically derived diagnostic system for PD was pro-
posed by the DSM–5 Personality and Personality Disorders Work Group (P&PDWG), and its
general criteria for PD are closely related to those proposed by the ICD–11Working Group for
the Revision of Classiﬁcation of Personality Disorders (APA, 2013; Tyrer, Reed, & Crawford,
2015).1 Its general criteria for PD are based on the emerging body of research showing that PD
is characterized by (a) impairment in self and interpersonal functioning and (b) the presence
of one or more pathological personality traits (APA, 2013; Bender, Morey, & Skodol, 2011;
Morey et al., 2015; Morey et al., 2011; Skodol, 2012, 2014). This diagnostic system thus rec-
ognizes that PDs consist of common features (i.e., self/interpersonal functioning impairments)
1 The P&PDWG proposed this model of personality disorders for inclusion in the DSM–5. The P&PDWG’s
model was approved by the DSM–5 Task Force; however, in the end, the Board of Trustees of the American
Psychiatric Association rejected this model for placement in the main section of the DSM–5 (Section II), and
it was placed in Section III (“Emerging Measures and Models”) under the title “Alternative DSM–5 Model for
Personality Disorders” (AMPD). The DSM–IV categorical model was retained in Section II of the DSM–5 virtu-
ally unchanged. The reasons why the Board of Trustees ultimately rejected the AMPD are complex and extend
beyond the scope of this article. The reasons and history behind this decision are thoroughly detailed elsewhere
(Morey et al., 2015; Skodol, 2014; Zachar, Krueger, & Kendler, 2016).
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and speciﬁc features unique to individual patients (i.e., pathological traits). Self functioning
involves the domains of identity and self-direction, and interpersonal functioning involves the
domains of empathy and intimacy. The domain of identity consists of (a) experiencing one-
self as unique, with clear boundaries between self and others; (b) stability of self-esteem and
accuracy of self-appraisal; and (c) a capacity for, and ability to regulate, a range of emotional
experiences. The domain of self-direction consists of (a) pursuing coherent and meaningful
short- and long-term goals, (b) the utilization of constructive and prosocial internal standards
of behavior, and (c) the ability to self-reﬂect productively. The domain of empathy consists of
(a) comprehension and appreciation of others’ experiences and motivations, (b) tolerance of
differing perspectives, and (c) understanding the effects of one’s own behavior on others.
Finally, the domain of intimacy consists of (a) depth and duration of connection with others,
(b) a desire and capacity for closeness, and (c) mutuality of regard reﬂected in interpersonal
behavior.
The second feature of PD is the presence of pathological traits (e.g., emotional labil-
ity, depressivity, grandiosity, callousness, impulsivity). Factor analyses consistently reveal that
pathological personality traits are organized into ﬁve dimensional factors reﬂecting the patho-
logical ends of the ﬁve-factor model (FFM) of normal personality (De Fruyt et al., 2013; Markon
et al., 2005; Morey, Krueger et al., 2013; Quilty et al., 2013; Sheets & Craighead, 2007;
Van den Broeck et al., 2014; Watson et al., 2013; Wright & Simms, 2014, 2015; Wright et al.,
2012; Zimmermann et al., 2014): (a) Negative Affectivity = Neuroticism, (b) Detachment =
inverse of Extraversion, (c) Antagonism = inverse of Agreeableness, (d) Disinhibition = inverse
ofConscientiousness and (e) Psychoticism, which reﬂects odd/eccentric/unusual behaviors and
cognitions characteristic of schizotypal personality traits. The relationship between Psychoti-
cism and Openness (which is not strongly linked to PD; Samuel & Widiger, 2008) is complex
and currently under investigation. What is critical is that these factor analyses show that PD
(a) is hierarchically organized (Figure 1), (b) exists on a continuumwith the core dimensions of
normal personality, and (c) has a structure that shares a strong resemblance to the factor struc-
ture of general psychopathology (Caspi et al., 2014; Keyes et al., 2013; Kotov et al., 2011,
2017; Krueger & Markon, 2006; Lahey et al., 2012; Markon, 2010; Wright et al., 2013).
Thus, a person can be said to have a PD when they have signiﬁcant impairment in their
identity, self-direction, capacity for empathy and/or intimacy, along with maladaptive person-
ality trait(s) from the Negative Affectivity, Detachment, Antagonism, Disinhibition and/or Psy-
choticism dimensions of personality (APA, 2013). The unique proﬁle of personality traits and
impairment in self/interpersonal functioning is what differentiates different styles of PD from
each other (e.g., borderline PD vs. psychopathic PD).
With this in mind, we can now approach an operational deﬁnition of psychopathy in
this larger context of PD. Patients with psychopathy are typically described as lacking remorse,
callous, grandiose, manipulative, superﬁcially charming, impulsive, and prone to violent and
antisocial behavior (Hare & Neumann, 2008). While psychopathy is one of the most exten-
sively studied PDs, debates continue surrounding its nature and structure (Cooke, Hart, Logan,
& Michie, 2012; Cooke & Michie, 2001; Hare & Neumann, 2008; Poythress & Hall, 2011;
Sellbom, Cooke, & Hart, 2015; Skeem & Cooke, 2010). To make headway on an empirical un-
derstanding of the nature/structure of psychopathy, Cooke et al. (2012) developed a concept
map of psychopathy based on an extensive literature review and consultations with experts
in the ﬁeld. The result of this process was the Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic
Personality (CAPP; Cooke et al., 2012; Cooke et al., 2004), which identiﬁes 33 personality
traits that were translated into nontechnical language and rationally grouped into six domains
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the hierarchical structure of personality pathology. Two
superordinate factors, called Internalizing and Externalizing, emerge from a general personality
factor. Below this level there are three intermediate factors, for Internalizing splits into two lower-
order factors labeled Detachment and Negative Affectivity whereas Externalizing maintains its
structure. This three factor solution can then be decomposed into the ﬁve factors of Negative
Affectivity, Detachment, Antagonism, Disinhibition and Psychoticism, each containing the lower-
order trait facets that load on their respective trait domains. Psychoticism has complex links to the
superordinate factors and this relationship is currently under investigation. Figure based on Wright
et al. (2012).
(Table 1). These domains are the Self, Emotional, Dominance, Attachment, Behavioral, and
Cognitive domains. The CAPP provides an adequate descriptive account of the psychopa-
thy construct, as evidenced by professionals’ prototypicality ratings (Flórez et al., 2015; Hoff,
Rypdal, Mykletun, & Cooke, 2012; Kreis & Cooke, 2011; Kreis, Cooke, Michie, Hoff, & Logan,
2012). Further evidence that the CAPP adequately covers the relevant traits comes from the
large correlations (r = 0.66–0.73) between the CAPP domains and the Psychopathy Checklist–
Revised (PCL–R; Sandvik et al., 2012), which is undoubtedly the most validated assessment of
psychopathy (Hare, 2003; Hare & Neumann, 2008; Leistico et al., 2008; Patrick, 2006).
Despite ongoing controversies, three major ﬁndings have emerged about the nature/
structure of psychopathy. First, whether assessed using clinician-rated or self-report tools, there
is now convincing evidence that psychopathy is not a class or discrete category; rather, it is
a dimensional construct (Edens, Marcus, Lilienfeld, & Poythress, 2006; Guay, Ruscio, Knight,
& Hare, 2007; Hare & Neumann, 2008; Marcus, John, & Edens, 2004; Marcus, Lilienfeld,
Edens, & Poythress, 2006; Walters et al., 2007). That is, “a psychopath” is technically a mis-
nomer, insofar as it suggests someone who is qualitatively different from other people. Rather,
psychopathy reﬂects a cluster of pathological personality traits that exist on a continuum with
normal personality traits. Second, although there are differences depending on what mea-
sure is used, there is convergence about the structure of psychopathy. Factor analyses of the
PCL–R suggest that psychopathy consists of a superordinate psychopathy factor comprising two
higher-order correlated factors called Factor 1 (F1) and Factor 2 (F2), which further decompose
into four lower-order correlated factors or facets (Hare & Neumann, 2008; Neumann, Hare,
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Table 1. Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP) traits and domains
Domain Traits
Self Self-centered
Self-aggrandizing
Sense of uniqueness
Sense of entitlement
Sense of invulnerability
Self-justifying
Unstable self-concept
Emotional Lacks anxiety
Lacks pleasure
Lacks emotional depth
Lacks emotional stability
Lacks remorse
Dominance Antagonistic
Domineering
Deceitful
Manipulative
Insincere
Garrulous
Attachment Detached
Uncommitted
Unempathic
Uncaring
Behavioral Lacks perseverance
Unreliable
Reckless
Restless
Disruptive
Aggressive
Cognitive Suspicious
Lacks concentration
Intolerant
Inﬂexible
Lacks planfulness
& Newman, 2007). F1 contains the Interpersonal (e.g., grandiosity, conning/manipulative)
and Affective factors (e.g., lacks remorse, shallow affect), and F2 contains the Lifestyle (e.g.,
stimulation seeking, impulsivity) and Antisocial factors (e.g., poor behavioral controls, criminal
versatility). The CAPP traits converge with the PCL-R in meaningful ways (Sandvik et al., 2012).
Speciﬁcally, F1 is highly correlated (r > 0.60) with traits from the Self,Dominance, and Attach-
ment domains, whereas the Emotional domain is highly correlated with the Affective sub-factor
speciﬁcally. Traits from the Behavioral domain are highly correlated with F2, whereas the Cog-
nitive domain is highly correlated with the Lifestyle sub-factor speciﬁcally. Self-report measures
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of psychopathy have been developed and also support this two-factor/four-factor model, no-
tably the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale III (SRP–III; Williams, Paulhus, & Hare, 2007), the
Levinson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995; Salekin,
Chen, Sellbom, Lester, & MacDougall, 2014), and the Antisocial Process Screening Device
(APSD; Frick & Hare, 2001; Vitacco, Rogers, & Neumann, 2003).
There are, however, points of disagreement about the structure of psychopathy worth de-
scribing brieﬂy. Based on clinical formulations of psychopathy and conﬁrmatory factor analy-
ses, Cooke and Michie (2001) argued that the antisocial factor is not part of the core construct
but rather is merely a correlate or consequence of a psychopathic personality. Using the PCL-R,
they proposed a three-factor model with the antisocial items removed, leaving the remaining
traits grouping into the factors Arrogant and Deceitful Interpersonal Style, Deﬁcient Affective
Experience, and Impulsive and Irresponsible Behavioral Style (Cooke & Michie, 2001). This
three-factor model corresponds to the Interpersonal, Affective, and Lifestyle factors, respec-
tively, of the original four-factor model. While Cooke and Michie (2001) emphasized their dis-
agreement about the centrality of the Antisocial factor, their model is more alike than different.
Two other prominent models of psychopathy are (a) the Triarchic model (Patrick, Fowles, &
Krueger, 2009) and (2) the two-factor model of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI) and
its revision, the PPI–R (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). Based on a
reviewof theclinical and empirical literature, the Triarchicmodel identiﬁesDisinhibition,Boldness,
andMeanness as the essential factors of the construct (Patrick et al., 2009). The PPI is composed
of two higher-order factors called Fearless Dominance (PPI-FD) and Self-Centered Impulsivity
(PPI–SCI; Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen, & Krueger, 2003; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005).
The Meanness and Disinhibition factors of the Triarchic model capture traits associated
with F1 and F2, respectively, of the PCL-R (J. Anderson, Sellbom, Wygant, Salekin, & Krueger,
2014; Patrick et al., 2009; Sellbom & Phillips, 2013; Stanley, Wygant, & Sellbom, 2013).
Similarly, meta-analytic evidence shows that PPI–SCI is associated with F1 (r = 0.20–0.38),
F2 traits (r = 0.41–0.57) and total PCL (r = 0.51) scores—however PPI–SCI is evidently more
strongly linked to F2 traits (Marcus, Fulton, & Edens, 2013; Miller & Lynam, 2012). By contrast,
measures of “boldness” (e.g., PPI-FD, Triarchic Boldness) are at best modestly correlated with
measures of psychopathy (J. Anderson et al., 2014; Lynam & Miller, 2012; Miller & Lynam,
2012; Sellbom & Phillips, 2013; Stanley et al., 2013). Meta-analytic research shows that the
PPI–FD is weakly correlated with F1 (r = 0.21–0.23), F2 (r = 0.07–0.15) and total PCL (r =
0.16) scores (Marcus et al., 2013; Miller & Lynam, 2012). Indeed, prior meta-analyses of bold-
ness found little evidence that boldness is associated with known correlates of psychopathy
(e.g., violent/antisocial behavior, substance use) or with functional impairment, for the asso-
ciations with FFM traits show that people high in boldness can be described as emotionally
stable, calm, and even-tempered (i.e., low Negative Affectivity), as well as sociable, warm,
cheerful, and assertive (i.e., high Extraversion; Marcus et al., 2013; Miller & Lynam, 2012).
There is even evidence that boldness is associated with Openness (r = 0.36; Patrick &
Drislane, 2015), which has no relationship to psychopathy (r = −0.02; Decuyper, De Pauw,
De Fruyt, De Bolle, & De Clercq, 2009). Thus, boldness can be said to reﬂect emotionally sta-
ble extraversion rather than psychopathy, and thus is not a core feature of psychopathy (Lynam
& Miller, 2012; Miller & Lynam, 2012).
Taken together, there is general agreement in the ﬁeld that psychopathy has a hierar-
chical factor structure consisting of a superordinate psychopathy factor and two higher-order
correlated factors that are essentially identical to F1 and F2 of the PCL-R. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst
factor consists of traits captured by the Interpersonal and Affective factors of the PCL-R, the
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Self, Dominance, Emotional, and Attachment domains of the CAPP, and Meanness of the Tri-
archic model. The second factor consists of traits captured by the Lifestyle factor of the PCL-R,
the Behavioral and Cognitive domains of the CAPP, Disinhibition of the Triarchic model, and
the SCI factor of the PPI.
Most striking is that these two factors reﬂect maladaptive traits that correspond almost
identically to the factors Antagonism and Disinhibition, respectively. This is unsurprising given
that meta-analyses and expert ratings of the FFM consistently ﬁnd that psychopathy principally
reﬂects the inverse of Agreeableness (r = −0.55; i.e., Antagonism) and, to a lesser degree, the
inverse of Conscientiousness (r = −0.34; i.e., Disinhibition; Decuyper et al., 2009; Lynam &
Miller, 2015). It is also in keeping with factor analyses consistently revealing that a “psychopa-
thy factor” is a basic dimension of abnormal personality (Kushner, Quilty, Tackett, & Bagby,
2011; Livesley, 2011; Markon et al., 2005; Morey, Krueger et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2012).
The psychopathy factor is shown in Figure 1 under the label of Antagonism, within the super-
ordinate Externalizing factor of personality pathology (APA, 2013). Alternative labels for the
psychopathy factor in the literature are the dyssocial domain (ICD–11; Tyrer et al., 2015) and
Dissocial Behavior (DAPP–BQ; Livesley & Jackson, 2009). Thus, the superordinate psychopa-
thy factor can be reconceptualized as reﬂecting the general Externalizing factor of personality
pathology (Figure 1)—a point already suggested by Hare and colleagues (Hare & Neumann,
2008; Neumann et al., 2007).
This dimensional perspective is important because it may resolve a long-standing debate
about whether or not antisocial/criminal behavior and impulsivity are core components of psy-
chopathy (Hare & Neumann, 2008, 2010; Poythress & Hall, 2011; Skeem & Cooke, 2010).
The research above has suggested that, whereas the F1 traits of the PCL-R reﬂect the Antag-
onism dimension of personality pathology, the F2 traits reﬂect the Disinhibition dimension.
Furthermore, the superordinate psychopathy factor reﬂects the general Externalizing dimen-
sion of personality pathology. Thus, F1 and F2 traits may be considered part of the same
construct, insofar as psychopathy—broadly speaking—reﬂects the Externalizing dimension of
personality pathology (Hare & Neumann, 2008; Neumann et al., 2007). This common su-
perordinate factor explains why F1 and F2 scores are strongly positively correlated with each
other (Hare & Neumann, 2008). The superordinate factor of Externalizing also accounts for the
meta-analytic evidence that F1 and F2 scores are bothmoderately associated with general and
violent (including sexual) offending and institutional misconduct (Leistico et al., 2008). This is
unsurprising given the meta-analytic research showing that the inverse of Agreeableness (i.e.,
Antagonism) and the inverse of Conscientiousness (i.e., Disinhibition) are the strongest FFM
personality predictors of violent/antisocial behavior (S. E. Jones, Miller, & Lynam, 2011; Miller
& Lynam, 2001). On the other hand, given that psychopathy is more strongly correlated with
Antagonism vs. Disinhibition (Decuyper et al., 2009; Lynam & Miller, 2015), strictly speak-
ing, Antagonism (i.e., F1 traits) likely forms the core of the psychopathic personality, a point
which has been suggested by others (Poythress & Hall, 2011; Skeem & Cooke, 2010). This
is in keeping with factor analyses of the CAPP and prototypicality ratings of psychopathy—by
mental health and correctional professionals—which show that traits associated with the Self,
Attachment, and Dominance domains of the CAPP are the core personality traits of the disor-
der (Flórez et al., 2015; Hoff et al., 2012; Kreis & Cooke, 2011; Kreis et al., 2012; Sellbom
et al., 2015; Sörman et al., 2014).
A working operational deﬁnition of psychopathy can therefore be proffered, based on
the aforementioned evidence on the nature/structure of psychopathy and PDs more generally.
A patient can be said to have a psychopathic personality when they have high levels of
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Antagonism traits, which may or may not co-occur with Disinhibition traits. These traits are
speciﬁc expressions of a more general impairment in their self/interpersonal functioning, such
that the patient’s identity, self-direction, capacity for empathy and/or intimacy is characterized
by grandiosity, egocentricity, absent or few prosocial internal standards, limited self-reﬂection,
difﬁculties understanding/appreciating other’s experiences, callousness, and/or limited mutu-
ality in relationships. There is limited mutuality because the patient’s relationships are con-
ceptualized largely in terms of meeting their self-regulatory and self-esteem needs, leading to
manipulative, domineering, and/or uncommitted/detached relations with others.
Our article focuses on modeling lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing because these two
traits are consistently ranked among the most prototypical traits of psychopathic PD in psycho-
metric research (Cooke & Michie, 2001; Hare & Neumann, 2008; Sellbom et al., 2015) and in
surveys of mental health and correctional professionals’ expert opinions about this PD (Flórez
et al., 2015; Hoff et al., 2012; Kreis & Cooke, 2011; Kreis et al., 2012). Furthermore, these
traits load on the Antagonism domain of personality pathology (APA, 2013; Kotov et al., 2017;
Livesley, 2011; Wright et al., 2012), the core cluster of traits of the psychopathic personality
(Poythress & Hall, 2011; Skeem & Cooke, 2010). Lacks remorse is a trait manifested by indi-
viduals described as unrepentant, unapologetic, or unashamed (e.g., denies having hurt others
or minimizes the consequences for the victim, blames harmful behavior on others), whereas
individuals with the trait self-aggrandizing are described as self-important, conceited, or con-
descending (e.g., regards self as being of higher status, dismissive toward those they consider
beneath them; Cooke et al., 2004). Furthermore, as we will see, the pathogenesis of these
traits has been the focus of signiﬁcant theorizing within the psychotherapeutic literature. This
is important because these psychotherapeutic models provide us with a rich and clinically rel-
evant theoretical framework that can be formalized in terms of (active) inference and predictive
coding. Our model, therefore, is not a complete account of psychopathy, for many traits still
need to be formalized (Table 1). Rather, we believe that this model provides an initial proof of
concept of the utility of the inference framework to understanding psychopathy. We illustrate
this utility by showing that the two cardinal traits of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing can
be modeled in terms of abnormal Bayesian inference. It is our hope that other traits will yield
to a similar formulation under this framework.
PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC MODELS OF PSYCHOPATHY
Psychotherapeutic models contribute to psychometric accounts of psychopathy by providing
etiological frameworks to explain the pathogenesis of PDs. As we will demonstrate, there is
a great deal of commonality between the cognitive and psychodynamic models of psychopa-
thy, particularly with regard to their joint emphasis on (a) the importance of early adverse
attachment experiences interacting with genetic vulnerabilities in developing a psychopathic
patient’s core self-image as worthless and shameful and (b) how psychopathic traits can be
understood as maladaptive “defense mechanisms” or “coping strategies” to this profoundly
negative core self-image. These commonalities suggest that an integrated psychotherapeutic
perspective is emerging. This psychotherapeutic account will be important, because it pro-
vides the theoretical constructs for formalizing lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing in terms of
abnormal Bayesian inference.
Psychodynamic Models of Psychopathy
In psychodynamic theory, patients with psychopathy are often described as having deep-seated
self-related negative emotions, particularly feelings of worthlessness and shame. These feelings
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are rooted in their early experiences of being devalued, made to feel inadequate and unaccept-
able in the eyes of their attachment ﬁgures (Gacono, Meloy, & Berg, 1992; Kernberg, 1985;
Kohut, 1966, 1977; Meloy & Shiva, 2007; Perry, Presniak, & Olson, 2013). During develop-
ment, the ﬁrst mental representations of the self and others are constructed from these early
interactions with attachment ﬁgures, called internal working models (IWMs), which often oper-
ate largely unconsciously (Bowlby, 1969, 1973; Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000). Psychopathic
patients’ adverse attachment experiences lead to the formation of an IWM of the self charac-
terized as worthless and shameful, which inﬂuences how these patients subsequently interpret
information and regulate their self-esteem, emotions, and behavior (Lorenzini & Fonagy, 2013).
Consistent with this, there is robust evidence that experiences precluding the formation of se-
cure attachments, such as abuse, neglect, parental separation, and parental dysfunction, are
risk factors for psychopathy and for violent/antisocial behavior (Campbell, Porter, & Santor,
2004; Cohen et al., 2014; Craparo, Schimmenti, & Caretti, 2013; Douglas, Hart, Webster, &
Belfrage, 2013; Graham, Kimonis, Wasserman, & Kline, 2012; Hoeve et al., 2009; Johnson,
Cohen, Brown, Smailes, & Bernstein, 1999; Kolla et al., 2013; Luntz &Widom, 1994; Marshall
& Cooke, 1999; National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence, 2010; Poythress, Skeem,
& Lilienfeld, 2006; Roberts, Yang, Zhang, & Coid, 2008).
From a psychodynamic perspective, psychopathic personality traits reﬂect the operation
of defense mechanisms that protect against the conscious experience of powerful self-related
negative emotions arising from the IWM of the self. Speciﬁcally, individuals with psychopa-
thy use denial, rationalization, and projection to disavow these negative experiences (Perry
et al., 2013). Moreover, they construct a grandiose self-image to distort their self-appraisal
and devalue and act aggressively toward others who threaten their grandiose veneer. Self-
aggrandizement thus distorts the patient’s self-image to defend against their painful feelings
of shame and worthlessness arising from their IWM of the self. Similarly, a lack of remorse
defends against the conscious experience of these negative self-related emotions after breach-
ing social norms (e.g., committing violent or antisocial acts) by denying having hurt others or
minimizing the consequences of their actions. Lacking remorse thus serves a vital function
for patients, because they are extremely sensitive to feeling worthless/shameful and will do
anything to bypass or diminish these emotions. Such defensive functioning can take the form
of hostility and violence, which can restore a patient’s self-esteem by making the perceived
perpetrator of the shaming feel vulnerable and powerless (Logan & Johnstone, 2010). The ex-
treme end of such reactive aggression is homicide. Patients’ low tolerance for these negative
emotions is well known in the correctional/forensic rehabilitation literature (C. M. Jones, 2014;
Maruna & Ramsden, 2004; Walker & Bright, 2009) and likely has its roots in the IWM of the
self, which developed from the patients’ early adverse attachment experiences.
Cognitive Models of Psychopathy
Although described using different terms, cognitive models of psychopathy have much in com-
mon with this psychodynamic formulation. The two major models are Davidson’s (2007)
cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) model and the schema focused therapy (SFT) model
(Bernstein, Arntz, & de Vos, 2007; Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). Davidson (2007) de-
veloped CBT for PDs, which formed the basis of the psychotherapeutic intervention of the
Chromis programme for treatment of high-risk offenders in the United Kingdom with high lev-
els of psychopathic traits (Tew & Atkinson, 2013). The CBT model integrates the traditional
cognitive model of psychopathology with attachment theory, developmental psychology, and
Beck and colleagues’ (A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990; A. T. Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2004) evo-
lutionary perspective on PDs. The cognitive model understands psychopathology as emerging
Computational Psychiatry 101
Model of Lacks Remorse and Self-Aggrandizing Prosser et al.
across three levels of belief: (a) schemas or “core beliefs,” (b) intermediate beliefs, and (c)
automatic thoughts (A. T. Beck, 1964; A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990; A. T. Beck et al., 2004;
J. S. Beck, 2011). Schemas are the most basic structures that organize our experience and
construct meaning out of our perceptions. Schemas play a fundamental and global role in
information processing because they contain core beliefs about the self, others, and the world,
which ultimately inﬂuence how patients think, feel, and behave moment by moment. For this
reason, schemas are often not consciously articulated or accessible and thus operate outside
conscious awareness. Intermediate beliefs are more consciously articulated and accessible
rules, attitudes, and assumptions about oneself, others, and the world (e.g., “You can’t trust
people”). Intermediate beliefs are thus a bridge between schemas and the ﬁnal level of belief:
automatic thoughts. Automatic thoughts are the most superﬁcial level of cognition, because
they are the reﬂexive thoughts that enter consciousness in response to situations that activate
underlying schemas and intermediate beliefs. Automatic thoughts reﬂect the deeper layers of
belief and directly inﬂuence how a patient feels and behaves. The CBT model of PD integrates
this traditional cognitive model with an evolutionary perspective, because it is hypothesized
that these schemas can also activate innate behavioral strategies, which are genetically deter-
mined behavioral patterns (e.g., aggression) that promoted survival and reproduction through-
out most of human evolution (A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990; A. T. Beck et al., 2004). Key to the
CBT model of PDs is the idea that the interaction between a person’s genetic predispositions
(e.g., temperament, neuropsychological functioning) and childhood environment shapes the
development of the person’s schemas and behavioral strategies. If a primary caregiver is emo-
tionally unavailable to their child, insensitive or unresponsive to the child’s emotional needs,
or has a chaotic or harsh parenting style, the child will likely develop an insecure attachment
style as a consequence of developing dysfunctional IWMs (i.e., core beliefs) about themselves
and others (Bowlby, 1973; Davidson, 2007; Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000). Throughout de-
velopment, patients with PD learn a variety of strategies to cope with their core beliefs of low
self-worth, vulnerability, and being unloved. Furthermore, an adverse environment can am-
plify or inhibit the innate behavioral strategies in patients with PDs, such that they can become
overdeveloped or underdeveloped and thus maladaptive in modern social environments.
From the CBT model’s perspective, the early adverse attachment experiences psycho-
pathic patients encounter interact with their genetic vulnerabilities, resulting in the formation
and reinforcement of dysfunctional schemas, such that they have a core belief about them-
selves as being unworthy, powerless, and unloved (Davidson, 2007). Additionally, consistent
with the psychodynamic model, compensatory intermediate beliefs develop as a way to cope
with these deep feelings of worthlessness and inadequacy. For instance, patients typically
form egocentric and self-aggrandizing beliefs that they are strong, can do whatever they want,
and are entitled to exploit others and thus show a lack of remorse for their antisocial behavior
(A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990; A. T. Beck et al., 2004). Compensatory coping strategies can also
involve innate behavioral strategies. For example, patients learn to use hostility and violence
to avoid being perceived by others as weak, which triggers intolerable anxiety and feelings of
vulnerability, resulting in the overdevelopment of aggression (Davidson, 2007).
SFT has similarly been adapted for use in forensic psychiatric hospitals in the Nether-
lands, called Terbeschikkingstelling (TBS) clinics, for the purpose of treating forensic patients
with severe PDs, particularly patients with psychopathy (Bernstein et al., 2007). While not ex-
clusively a cognitive model—because it combines cognitive, behavioral, psychodynamic, and
existential/humanistic approaches—the SFT model has prominent features of the traditional
cognitive model of psychopathology. There are three major components to the SFT model of
PDs: Early Maladaptive Schemas (EMSs), coping strategies, and Schema Modes (Young et al.,
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2003). EMSs are the core pathology of patients with PDs, and they develop out of the in-
teraction between genetic vulnerabilities (e.g., temperament) and unmet emotional needs the
patient experienced early in life.
Like IWMs and core beliefs, EMSs are highly stable structures that organize a person’s
core self-identity and mental representations of others around speciﬁc themes and are elabo-
rated throughout life. The SFT model identiﬁes 18 EMSs, which are grouped into ﬁve domains,
reﬂecting failures to meet the ﬁve universal emotional needs (Table 2). Patients experience
powerful self-related negative emotions (e.g., shame, vulnerability, self-hatred) when an EMS
is activated. Patients attempt to eliminate, or at least diminish, these negative emotions using
three coping strategies: Schema Maintenance, Schema Avoidance, and Schema Compensa-
tion. In Schema Maintenance, the patient reinforces their schema by discounting information
that would disconﬁrm their EMS through cognitive distortions or self-defeating behavior. In
Schema Avoidance, the patient attempts to suppress thoughts or feelings or behaviorally avoid
situations associated with their EMS. In Schema Compensation, the patient overcompensates
for the negative emotions by acting or generating emotions in the polar opposite direction of
the content of their EMS.
Schema Modes are deﬁned as those schemas and coping strategies that are currently
dominating the moment to moment thoughts, feelings and behavior of a person. Young et al.
(2003) originally identiﬁed 11 Schema Modes; however, as a consequence of their ther-
apeutic work with personality disordered forensic patients, Bernstein et al. (2007) expanded
the list to include four new Schema Modes (Table 3). Patients with psychopathy are
Table 2. Early maladaptive schemas and schema domains
Basic emotional need Schema domain Early maladaptive schemas
1. Secure attachments Disconnection 1. Abandonment/instability
to others and rejection 2. Mistrust/abuse
3. Emotional deprivation
4. Defectiveness/shame
5. Social isolation/alienation
2. Autonomy, competence Impaired autonomy 6. Dependence/incompetence
and sense of identity and performance 7. Vulnerability to harm or illness
8. Enmeshment/undeveloped self
9. Failure
3. Realistic limits and Impaired limits 10. Entitlement/grandiosity
self-control 11. Insufﬁcient self-control/
self-discipline
4. Freedom to express valid Other-directedness 12. Subjugation
needs and emotions 13. Self-sacriﬁce
14. Approval-seeking/recognition
seeking
5. Spontaneity and play Over-vigilance and 15. Negativity/pessimism
inhibition 16. Emotional inhibition
17. Unrelenting standards/
hypercriticalness
18. Punitiveness
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Table 3. Schema modes
Modes Schemas
Child modes: Involve feeling, thinking, 1. Vulnerable child (abandoned, abused,
and acting in a “childlike” manner or humiliated child)
2. Angry child
3. Impulsive, undisciplined child
4. Lonely child
Dysfunctional coping modes: Involve 5. Detached protector
attempts to protect the self from pain through 6. Detached self-soother/self-stimulator
maladaptive forms of coping 7. Compliant surrenderer
8. Angry protectora
Maladaptive parent modes: Involve 9. Punitive, critical parent
internalized dysfunctional parent “voices” 10. Demanding parent
Over-compensatory modes: Involve 11. Self-aggrandizer mode
extreme attempts to compensate for feelings 12. Bully and attack mode
of shame, loneliness, or vulnerability 13. Conning and manipulative modea
14. Predator modea
15. Over-controller mode (paranoid and
obsessive-compulsive types)a
aNew Schema Mode added by Bernstein et al. (2007).
characterized by prominent use of four Schema Modes that involve compensatory coping re-
sponses to their EMSs, particularly those EMSs with themes of disconnection and rejection
(Bernstein et al., 2007). Speciﬁcally, they predominantly use the Self-aggrandizer mode, Bully
and attack mode, Conning and manipulative mode, and Predator mode as a way to overcom-
pensate for feelings of shame, loneliness and vulnerability. The Self-aggrandizer mode allows
the patient to distort their conscious thoughts and feelings about their self in order to “defend
against” or “cope with” their deep self-related negative emotions arising from their underlying
EMSs (i.e., IWM). Similarly, the Predator mode allows the patient to overcome deep feelings of
shame andworthlessness by becoming a predator who can eliminate threats to their self-esteem
without remorse and also command respect from others through fear (Bernstein et al., 2007).
Toward an Integrated Psychotherapeutic Model of Psychopathy
This convergence of psychodynamic, CBT, and SFT models of psychopathic traits—speciﬁcally
lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing—is extremely striking. This is because it suggests that the
psychotherapeutic ﬁeld is moving toward an integrated model of these traits. This integrated
model centers on two hypotheses:
1. Early adverse attachment experiences interact with genetic vulnerabilities to shape the
development of a psychopathic patient’s core self-image as worthless and shameful. This
core self-image is the ﬁrst self-identity the patient develops during childhood and ado-
lescence, and it continues to be elaborated upon throughout life. Furthermore, this core
self-image is often not consciously articulated or accessible and thus operates outside
conscious awareness. Various models call this core self-image the IWM of the self,
self-schema, core belief, or EMS.
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2. The traits lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing are maladaptive defense mechanisms that
allow the patient with psychopathy to eliminate or at least diminish (i.e., cope with) the
inﬂuence of their negative core self-image on their conscious experience. These defense
mechanisms are reﬂected in more consciously articulated and accessible beliefs about
the self. Various models call these more conscious beliefs intermediate beliefs or Schema
Modes.
This integrated psychotherapeutic model of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing will be the ba-
sis of the Bayesian formulation described in the section “A Bayesian Account of Psychopathy.”
However, before outlining the model, it is necessary to ﬁrst consider the broader theoretical
context for understanding the predictive coding framework (Corlett & Fletcher, 2014; Friston,
2010; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Friston, Stephan et al., 2014).
PREDICTIVE CODING, ACTIVE INFERENCE, AND THE BAYESIAN BRAIN
Predictive coding can be regarded as a corollary of the free-energy principle. The free-energy
principle starts with the truism that biological systems are a unique class of self-organizing
systems that exhibit a generalized homeostasis; that is, they resist the natural tendency to dis-
order by maintaining their physiological and sensory states in constantly changing internal
and external environments. This self-sustaining characteristic means that an organism’s states
must have low entropy if it is to remain viable and adaptive in its environments. Entropy is
the average “surprise” or uncertainty, which, from an organism’s perspective, is unexpected
(i.e., unpredicted) states. Surprise thus depends on the predictions of the organism, for what
is surprising for one organism (e.g., being a ﬁsh out of water) may not be for another (Friston,
2010). This is important because it means that an organism’s evolutionary imperative of main-
taining homeostasis (i.e., survival) can be accomplished if it minimizes its long-term average
surprise, because failing to minimize surprise will necessarily lead to an increase in entropy
(i.e., disorder) in the system.
In this context, surprise can be minimized by minimizing free-energy or—put simply—
minimizing prediction error. Organisms minimize prediction error either by changing their
predictions about how inputs are caused so that predictions match inputs, or through action
that changes inputs so that they are consistent with predictions. This is known as active infer-
ence. The upshot is that by minimizing the discrepancy between an organism’s predictions and
the actual inputs it receives, an organism can minimize its long-term average surprise (i.e., un-
certainty or entropy) and thus increase the probability that it will survive (Friston, 2009, 2010;
Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006).
This formalism might sound a bit mathematical and abstract—and difﬁcult to connect
to how we function as sentient agents with beliefs. However, one key insight connects the
imperatives for survival to beliefs and inference. This insight rests upon the fact that surprise
is mathematically the same thing as (negative log) Bayesian model evidence: As surprise is
resolved, Bayesianmodel evidence is increased. This means that every living organism behaves
as if it is a little statistician, analyzing its sensory data in exactly the same way that scientists
evaluate the evidence for their hypotheses about how experimental data were caused. In fact,
free-energy is used routinely in data analysis and Bayesian model comparison to ﬁnd the best
model or explanation for observed data. In short, the free-energy principle and its corollary—
the Bayesian brain hypothesis—offers a formal framework within which to understand action
and perception in terms of a subject’s explanations or probabilistic beliefs about how the world
generates sensations. In this view, minimizing surprise is, literally, the search for evidence for
one’s own existence, under generative models of our self.
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Predictive coding can be viewed as an instantiation of this “self-evidencing” process
(Hohwy, 2016), and much neurophysiological and neuroanatomical evidence suggests that the
brain implements this evidence-gathering, surprise-reducing, uncertainty-resolving behavior
(Bastos et al., 2012; Clark, 2013; Friston, 2005, 2009, 2010; Huang & Rao, 2011). One
major neuroanatomical fact about the brain—crucial to predictive coding—is its hierarchical
organization (Bastos et al., 2012; Friston, 2005). In the predictive coding framework, expec-
tation units (associated with deep pyramidal cells) at each level in the processing hierarchy
predict neural representations of expectations at lower levels of the hierarchy (with basic
sensory inputs represented at the lowest levels). These top-down predictions are received by
lower-level prediction error units (associated with superﬁcial pyramidal cells), which compare
predictions with the expectations at that level. When there is a mismatch, a prediction error
signal is generated—which ascends the hierarchy to revise the higher-level representations in
order to provide better predictions. These then explain away (minimize) prediction error in the
level below, thereby resolving prediction error throughout the hierarchy and reducing surprise.
In summary, descending connections between levels convey top-down predictions,
whereas ascending connections convey prediction errors. Prediction errors are minimized
at each level of the processing hierarchy, making the network more accurate in terms of ex-
plaining the inputs it receives from the environment. For example, if you change your facial
expression, my descending predictions of the visual input (in terms of contours and shading,
say, around your eyes) may no longer be accurate—eliciting a visual prediction error. This pre-
diction error will ascend the visual hierarchy to revise high-level expectations about the causes
of visual input, for example, you are “smiling.” This updated expectation or hypothesis (i.e.,
you are smiling) then provides better predictions of visual input, ensuring prediction errors are
minimized throughout the hierarchy (Strathearn, Li, Fonagy, & Montague, 2008).
How does predictive coding instantiate a form of Bayesian inference? In Bayesian prob-
ability, the posterior probability or belief after observing data is evaluated by combining prior
beliefs (i.e., beliefs prior to observing the data) with the likelihood of the observed data. The
deﬁnition of belief in this context is not the traditional one (i.e., a consciously held proposi-
tion); rather, beliefs are probability distributions (which may or may not be conscious) over
some unknown state or attribute of the world (e.g., whether you are smiling or not). Bayesian
beliefs thus function like hypotheses. They are generally characterized by their expectation
or mean, describing the most likely value, and precision (or inverse variance), describing the
expected conﬁdence (or inverse uncertainty) associated with the belief. In predictive cod-
ing, prior beliefs are encoded by neural activity conveying top-down predictions from deep
pyramidal cells at higher levels, whereas the likelihood is conveyed by bottom-up prediction
error signals from superﬁcial pyramidal cells from the level below. Posterior expectations are
encoded at each level in the hierarchy and reﬂect the brain’s perception at that level of
(hierarchical) abstraction.
In a hierarchical setting, this means that posterior expectations at one level function as
prior beliefs for the level below, and prediction error signals at one level serve as inputs for
the level above. When a conﬂict exists between inputs and prior beliefs, precision plays a
vital role in how the brain resolves the discrepancy. This is because precision determines the
relative weights they are afforded, when the posterior expectation at a given level is evaluated.
If the prior belief is relatively precise—compared to ascending input—the posterior expectation
will be closer to the mean of the prior. However, if the ascending input is relatively precise
compared to the prior, it will dominate the posterior expectation. In other words, the rela-
tive precision of top-down prior beliefs and bottom-up inputs can dramatically inﬂuence the
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kinds of inferences we make. As we will see, abnormalities in the encoding of precision will
be important for understanding the pathogenic mechanisms underlying lacks remorse and self-
aggrandizing. The available neurobiological evidence suggests that precision is encoded by the
synaptic gain of superﬁcial pyramidal cells encoding prediction errors, which are controlled
by neuromodulatory systems (e.g., dopaminergic, cholinergic) and/or synchronized neural
activity (Feldman & Friston, 2010).
A schematic of predictive coding can help us understand these processes more con-
cretely (Figure 2). The left panel displays how superﬁcial pyramidal cells (red circles) encod-
ing prediction errors are reciprocally connected at each level and between levels to deep
pyramidal cells (blue circles), which encode top-down predictions for the level below and
posterior expectations at each level. The expected precision is mediated by neuromodulatory
cells whose projections to superﬁcial pyramidal cells modulate their responsiveness or gain.
The neurophysiological and neuroanatomical evidence suggests that these neuromodulatory
pathways are under top-down inﬂuences (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Ferenczi et al., 2016; Friston,
2009, 2010; A. J. Yu & Dayan, 2005), which is indicated schematically by the descending
connection from the highest level to the neuromodulatory cells. The right panel displays the
probability distributions of the prior (blue), likelihood (red), and posterior (purple = blue +
red) distributions at the intermediate level in the hierarchical network. The prior distribution
is supplied by descending connections conveying the top-down predictions from the level
above, whereas the likelihood distribution is supplied by the ascending connections convey-
ing the prediction error signal from the level below. The top graph illustrates a situation where
the ascending input—to an intermediate level—conﬂicts with top-down predictions, such that
the brain’s perception (i.e., posterior expectation) of the input at that level is an approximately
equal compromise between the two distributions. However, when neuromodulation increases
prior precision—relative to sensory evidence—the posterior distribution shifts toward the
prior and away from the likelihood. In other words, in this Bayesian synthesis, sensory evidence
is effectively ignored by emphasizing prior beliefs. Conversely, when neuromodulators sub-
stantially increase the precision of the likelihood relative to the prior, the incoming data over-
power top-down predictions, shifting the brain’s perception toward the input.
Figure 2. Schematic of a predictive coding network and the role of precision in Bayesian
inference. See main text for details.
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One can see why the process of optimizing expected precision has been associated
with selective attention, because precision helps the brain to emphasize particular streams or
aspects of sensory inputs, while selectively attenuating sensory precision to ignore evidence
against prior beliefs. It is this particular aspect of Bayesian inference that appears to be the
most likely candidate for explaining the false inferences and aberrant beliefs in psychopathol-
ogy (Adams et al., 2013; Friston, Stephan et al., 2014). In other words, we do not necessarily
have to have bad models of the world to entertain false beliefs. Rather, false inference can
arise from a failure to properly balance the precision of prior expectations in relation to sen-
sory evidence—or, more simply, an inability to attend to or ignore evidence that contradicts
our prior expectations. The predictive coding framework has a special role here in connect-
ing false inference to the neurophysiological processes that are implicated in augmenting or
attenuating precision at different levels of the cortical hierarchy. Crucially, these processes
necessarily involve synaptic neuromodulation and a pathophysiology of synaptic gain con-
trol or excitability of the sort seen in psychiatric conditions. Understanding false beliefs (e.g.,
delusions and hallucinations) in terms of abnormal neuromodulation underpins many recent
treatments of psychiatric conditions, ranging from schizophrenia to functional (i.e., “hysteri-
cal”) symptoms (Adams et al., 2013; Corlett & Fletcher, 2014; Edwards et al., 2012; Friston,
Stephan et al., 2014; Montague et al., 2012; Prosser et al., 2016). In what follows, we apply
this line of argument to perhaps the most important prior beliefs we call upon, namely, beliefs
about our self.
A BAYESIAN ACCOUNT OF PSYCHOPATHY
Predictive coding provides us with the conceptual resources to formalize in terms of Bayesian
inference the integrated psychotherapeutic model of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing out-
lined in the section “Psychotherapeutic Models of Psychopathy.” Speciﬁcally, these two psy-
chopathic traits can be described under a hierarchical model of an embodied and prosocial
self (Figure 3A). In this model, the valence (positive vs. negative) of conscious thoughts about
the self is represented as an empirical prior2 or posterior belief, which integrates top-down pre-
dictions regarding self-appraisal with bottom-up affective signals from the IWM of the self (i.e.,
self-schema) from the level below. Therefore, much like the cognitive theory described in the
section “Psychotherapeutic Models of Psychopathy” (A. T. Beck, 1964; A. T. Beck & Freeman,
1990; A. T. Beck et al., 2004; J. S. Beck, 2011), the prior beliefs about the self structure auto-
matic conscious thoughts about the self in a top-down manner according to their predictions
(i.e., the content of the beliefs). For this reason, these high-level prior beliefs are a formalization
of the cognitive model’s concept of intermediate beliefs, which, recall, are more consciously
articulated and accessible beliefs about oneself that shape conscious thoughts. Similarly, the
IWM of the self supplies evidence about the self from lower levels of the hierarchy. However,
these more basic self-representations are less consciously articulated and accessible and thus
operate largely outside the person’s awareness (i.e., subpersonal beliefs). This formulation res-
onates closely with Bayesian approaches to self-representations (Moutoussis, Fearon, et al.,
2014). Finally, neuromodulatory cells—which encode the precision of the top-down priors
and bottom-up affective signals on conscious thoughts—are regulated in a top-down manner
by descending connections in accord with high-level prior beliefs. Therefore we hypothesize
that the high-level prior beliefs about the self are the source of the control signal for modulating
the precision of bottom-up vs. top-down information about the self on conscious thoughts (i.e.,
2 Empirical priors are priors that occupy intermediate positions in hierarchical models. They are synonymous
with intermediate posteriors.
Computational Psychiatry 108
Model of Lacks Remorse and Self-Aggrandizing Prosser et al.
Figure 3. Bayesian model of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing. See main text for details.
posterior beliefs), which is indicated schematically in Figure 3 by the descending connection
from the highest level (i.e., the level of the prior beliefs about the self) to the neuromodulatory
cells. Clearly Figure 3 is a schematic representation, given that the computational and neuro-
biological details are likely much more complicated. Each one of these functionally distinct
levels undoubtedly encompasses multiple networks of brain regions and neuromodulatory sys-
tems working in concert with one another. For the present purposes, however, it is sufﬁcient
to note that, even under these simplifying assumptions, this sort of hierarchical inference can
illustrate how an integrated psychotherapeutic account of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing
may be formulated in a (neuronally plausible) computational architecture—as we elaborate
next.
When undefended (Figure 3A), psychopathic patients’ conscious thoughts are overpow-
ered by shame and worthlessness arising from their IWM of the self, resulting in automatic
conscious thoughts having posterior expectations (purple distribution) that are shifted toward
negative expectations about the self (red distribution) and away from their prior beliefs regard-
ing self-appraisal (blue distribution).
When self-aggrandizing (Figure 3B), psychopathic patients defend against the conscious
experience (posterior expectations) of shame and worthlessness arising from their IWM of the
self via two mechanisms: top-down predictions from prior beliefs about the self are (a) abnor-
mally elevated (prior distribution shifted rightwards) and (b) afforded too much precision (plus
sign and thick red arrow). This results in automatic conscious thoughts having inﬂated posi-
tive posterior expectations about the self, despite the underlying presence of feelings of shame
and worthlessness. Such descending neuromodulation by self-aggrandizing in effect ignores
prediction errors that would otherwise provide contrary evidence against their prior grandiose
beliefs about the self (e.g., feelings of shame/worthlessness). The neuromodulatory mechanism
in this instance rests on augmenting the precision of these prior grandiose beliefs. In this way,
the high-level prior beliefs about the self can be described as compensatory beliefs (or com-
pensatory “intermediate beliefs,” in the cognitive model’s sense of the term) against a more
basic, negative core self-schema (Davidson, 2007) by virtue of how they alter the posterior
beliefs about the self at the level of conscious thoughts.
When showing a lack of remorse (Figure 3C), the patient defends against the conscious
experience of shame and worthlessness (e.g., after breaching social norms) by decreasing the
precision of the affective input on conscious thoughts (minus sign and dotted red arrow) via
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neuromodulatory systems controlling the synaptic gain on the affective signals from the IWM
of the self. This results in automatic conscious thoughts having largely neutral (i.e., centered
on zero valence) posterior expectations about the self despite socially inappropriate behavior.
In this setting, the same defensive inference is in play (i.e., ignoring evidence that is contrary to
prior beliefs about self)—however, here themechanism involves an attenuation of the precision
of ascending prediction error. To illustrate the subtle but malignant effect precision can have on
inferences about the self and relations with others, we now turn to a simulation of psychopathy
using dyadic interactions in simple game.
Quantitative Simulations
In this section, we present some quantitative simulations of psychopathy to substantiate the hy-
potheses of the previous section; namely, that minimal impairments to the encoding of preci-
sion or uncertainty are sufﬁcient to explain psychopathic traits and abnormal inferences about
self-worth. We have until this point used predictive coding to illustrate hierarchical inference
in the brain. However, we will use an equivalent—free-energy minimizing—active inference
scheme, formulated in terms of discrete states. This is because discrete states are more apt
for modeling the sorts of games and behaviors associated with trust and reputation formation
(e.g., in behavioral economics), which can be used to simulate some of the claims we have
made about psychopathic traits. Although the formalism of these schemes differs from predic-
tive coding, the basic elements are conserved—namely, belief propagation using predictions
and prediction errors to update expectations about the latent or hidden states of the world
causing observable outcomes (Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2017;
Friston, Parr, & de Vries, 2017).
To illustrate the key role of precision at different levels of a hierarchical generative model,
we used a Markov decision process (Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2017). Active inference under
these models has been described in many previous applications, ranging from applications
to choice behavior through to epistemic foraging and visual searches (Mirza, Adams, Mathys,
& Friston, 2016; Parr & Friston, 2017; Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, & Friston,
2014). Here, we use exactly the same formalism and (free-energy minimizing) update scheme
to simulate a simple reputation game (Figure 4). In brief, the generative model underneath
these sorts of simulations comprises hidden or latent states of the world and the outcomes that
they generate. The mapping between states (i.e., causes) and outcomes (i.e., consequences)
is described by a likelihood (A) matrix, whose precision we will associate with precision at
the lower (e.g., sensory or perceptual) level of processing hierarchies. Transitions among hid-
den states depend upon policies or choices and are generally encoded in (choice dependent)
probability transition (B) matrices. We will associate the precision of these matrices with prior
precision—namely, the conﬁdence placed in prior beliefs about state transitions under differ-
ent choices. Finally, prior preferences over outcomes are encoded in a (C) matrix, in the form
of log prior probabilities. These can be thought of as the value of different outcomes.
The game we modeled involved deciding whether to keep a sum of money or donate it
to charity, depending upon how rich one is. The minimum requirements for this sort of game
include hidden states that encode how nice or charitable the subject is, and how rich they
believe themselves to be. Given these two hidden states, one can generate plausible outcomes.
In this instance a (prosocial) feedback of approval or disapproval. In addition, we included
the actual wealth of the subject as an observable feedback. In brief, our generative model
contained two sorts of hidden states. The ﬁrst was monetary wealth (with eight levels, ranging
from broke to wealthy). The second hidden state was self-worth (with two levels: charitable
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Figure 4. Schematic overview of the generative model used to simulate a simple reputation
game. This model is shown in graphical form, where the circles correspond to different states
(and outcomes) that a subject can be in (and observe). The red arrows correspond to the mapping
between latent or hidden states and their observable consequences. This is the likelihood matrix
(A) shown on the right. Transitions among these states are encoded by blue arrows (solid for donate
and broken for keep). The corresponding probability transition (B) matrices are shown on the right.
Finally, the preferences for outcomes are encoded in a (C) matrix. These preferences are speciﬁed
in terms of log prior probabilities. In this model, α and β can be regarded as encoding the precision
of sensory evidence and prior beliefs, respectively.
versus mean). The observable outcomes had the same form: with one visual cue reporting the
level of monetarywealth and another reporting approval or disapproval of the choice to donate
or keep an offer on each trial. The likelihood (A) matrix was an identity mapping between the
levels of the wealth factor. However, the mapping between the hidden state of self-worth and
the approval cue could be precise or imprecise, depending upon the subject’s predisposition.
In other words, the likelihood mapping could be deterministic, such that approval was always
generated by a charitable state of being or it could be imprecise, such that there was a 50-
50 chance of approval or disapproval irrespective of one’s self-worth. The prior probability
transition matrices (B) contained the structure and dynamics of the game. These are speciﬁed
separately (technically, conditioned upon) the two choices (donate or keep). For transitions
among levels of wealth, every time the offer was donated, the level of wealth fell to the level
below (or stayed at the lowest level). Conversely, if the choice was keep, the level of wealth
increased (unless at the most wealthy state). In addition, we modeled an attrition of wealth,
with a constant decay from higher levels to lower levels (with 10% probability of loss at each
trial). Heuristically, this means the subjects were spending their wealth at a constant rate and
could decide to accumulate more wealth by keeping the offer or, if they were sufﬁciently
wealthy, increase the probability of an approval rating by donating.
The probability transition matrix among self-worth states controlled the rate at which
self-worth changed from a charitable to a mean level (and vice versa), depending upon the
actions selected. The parameterization of this matrix allowed us to modulate how behavior
changed self-worth: here, donating ensured that a charitable self-worth was maintained, with
a small probability of moving from a mean to a charitable state, and vice versa for keeping the
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offer. Finally, prior preferences were encoded in the (C) matrix for both outcome modalities.
These comprised a log linear increase in prior preferences for being rich and a preference for
approval over disapproval, both of which were fairly precise (with log prior differences in the
range of four). The structure of this generative model and numerical examples of the likelihood
(A), prior transition (B) and prior preference (C) matrices are provided in Figure 4.
Equipped with this model, we can now simulate choice behavior, starting from any prior
expectations about self-worth and examine the long-term or equilibrium behavior. Here, we
characterized behavior and underlying beliefs in terms of the average wealth retained by syn-
thetic subjects—and the posterior expectation that they were nice. These simulations entailed
16 successive choices starting from a prior belief that they were charitable (but broke). By
repeating the simulations under different levels of the likelihood precision (encoded by α
Figure 4) and different precisions of the prior transition probabilities over self-worth (encoded
by β), we could examine the effects of likelihood and prior precision on behavior and con-
comitant self-worth. By decreasing the precision of the likelihood (i.e., the conﬁdence that
approval ratings were a veridical reﬂection of one’s self-worth), we hoped to simulate lacks
remorse, with an increasing tendency to keep offers. By increasing the precision of prior
beliefs, we then hoped to simulate self-aggrandizing, in terms of mean behavior in the face
of preserved self-worth.
Figure 5 shows the results of these simulations as heat maps for self-worth (left panel)
and wealth (right panel). As we would expect, synthetic subjects who accumulated the most
wealth, by giving relatively few donations, had a lower posterior expectation that they were
charitable. In other words, regions in the parameter space of likelihood and prior precision
with high self-worth (white areas on the left) were associated with low wealth (dark areas on
the right). Reducing α, or the degree to which self-worth reliably solicits approval, quickly
reduces donations leading to an accumulation of wealth (under higher levels of prior pre-
cision). The interpretation of β is subtler.3 A very high value results in an identity matrix,
de-coupling beliefs about transitions from choices. This corresponds to a high prior precision.
Conversely, low values of β give rise to transitions that depend sensitively on actions. This cor-
responds to reduced prior precision. When we increase β (i.e., increase prior precision), the
synthetic subject again accumulates more wealth, as the consequences for self-worth are less
affected by their choices. For higher levels of likelihood precision, reducing prior precision has
a non-monotonic effect on self-worth. However, when likelihood precision is low, increasing
prior precision leads to an increase in self-worth. In other words, the effect of likelihood and
prior precision show a strong interaction, where the likelihood precision permits a reversal of
the effect of prior precision, thereby enabling uncharitable behavior and paradoxically pre-
served self-worth despite socially inappropriate behavior (i.e., lacks remorse). This interaction
is entirely consistent with the notion that psychopathy can emerge successively by a reduction
sensory likelihood precision (i.e., a failure to attend to prosocial cues), followed by an increase
in the precision of prior beliefs (i.e., reduced sensitivity to choices), modeling lacks remorse
and self-aggrandizing, respectively. This interpretation is depicted graphically by the red line
in Figure 5.
These results are presented to illustrate that psychopathic behavior—and false inference
about the self—can emerge under fairly elementary generative models of one’s own behavior
by, and only by, changing the precision of beliefs at different levels of a self-model. Crucially,
3 Strictly speaking, β only plays the role of a precision until it falls to a value of one half (at which point beliefs
about state transitions are maximally imprecise at 50-50).
Computational Psychiatry 112
Model of Lacks Remorse and Self-Aggrandizing Prosser et al.
Figure 5. This ﬁgure shows the effects of changing the likelihood precision (α) and transition pre-
cision (β) during a simulation of 16 choices starting from a prior expectation about being money-
less but nice. This has been performed for synthetic subjects with different combinations of α and
β. These effects are shown in terms of the posterior expectation about being charitable (left image)
and the overall amount of wealth retained (right image). Although self-worth is generally lower for
parameters that lead to greater wealth accumulation, the synthetic agents with very low α and high
β (upper left corner of each plot) appear to have a higher posterior expectation of self-worth despite
uncharitable behaviors. The developmental trajectory of a hypothetical patient with psychopathic
traits is shown in red. Starting in the (altruistic) lower right corner, α initially decreases, uncoupling
external sources of approval from beliefs about self. This trajectory leads to behaviors that yield
greater monetary proﬁt, but a lower self-worth. By subsequently increasing β, the inﬂuence of de-
cisions on self-worth is diminished, uncoupling decisions from beliefs and resulting in uncharitable
behavior that does not unduly compromise self-worth.
at no point did we need to change the (simulated) preferences for being approved of (or be-
ing rich). Furthermore, the pathological behavior was evident even though all the (synthetic)
subjects had exactly the same form of beliefs about the effect of charitable donation on their
self-worth. In short, a sufﬁcient explanation for psychopathy (in this minimal example) was a
loss of subjective precision linking latent states to observable consequences and an increase in
the precision or conﬁdence about the volatility of latent states. The ﬁrst attenuation—of like-
lihood precision—means that (synthetic) psychopathic patients can, effectively, ignore (i.e.,
defend against) evidence that speaks against being the sort of person they would prefer to be
(e.g., shame, worthlessness). In a complementary fashion, an increase in the precision of prior
beliefs—about self-worth—means that they are more resistant to change and can maintain
their self-worth, even in the face of evidence to the contrary. In short, this simple simulation
illustrates the profound effect of precision on inference about latent states of the (prosocial)
world and, crucially, one’s relationship to that world.
Psychopathic States and Traits
With this framework, we can also see how the mechanisms underlying lacks remorse may
operate together with the mechanisms underlying self-aggrandizing to defend against shame
and worthlessness despite breaching social norms. Speciﬁcally, patients can decrease the
precision of the bottom-up affective signals from the IWM while simultaneously increasing
the precision of the elevated top-down self-appraisal from the high-level prior beliefs (i.e., in-
termediate beliefs) about the self. This type of defensive functioning appears to closely capture
the self-justifying trait of psychopathy, whereby patients use rationalization to minimize/deny
responsibility for their actions through self-serving (but inaccurate) explanations that preserve
their grandiose self-image (Cooke et al., 2004; Perry et al., 2013).
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These pathogenic mechanisms may become entrenched through a number of processes
such that they become stable traits over time. The literature on how psychopathic traits develop
during childhood and adolescence is still emerging (Frick et al., 2014), and it is clear that all
personality pathologies arise from a combination of genetic, temperamental, social, familial,
and psychological factors (Alwin et al., 2006). However, learningmay be a central mechanism
underlying the entrenchment of these maladaptive Bayesian inferences. This is because learn-
ing is a key mechanism through which the brain structurally and functionally encodes per-
ceived statistical regularities and reinforced associations via experience-dependent synaptic
plasticity (Caroni, Donato, & Muller, 2012; Friston, 2010). For instance, the patient may have
initially learned this type of defensive functioning from antisocial peers and/or family mem-
bers who may have been role models during their youth. Lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing
may become entrenched over time through positive reinforcement (e.g., from a social milieu
that rewards psychopathic personality traits by offering a sense of belonging, support, and self-
worth) and negative reinforcement (e.g., from the fact that these defense mechanisms relieve
the patient from their feelings of worthlessness and shame). Furthermore, the patient’s inter-
nal working (i.e., generative) model of the self may also become entrenched over time through
patterns of relationships the patient may have experienced from childhood into adulthood. For
example, repeated rejecting, punitive, invalidating, and unempathic interactions with peers,
teachers, social workers, police and correctional ofﬁcers, medical and mental health profes-
sionals, and even society as a whole play directly into the patient’s core self-image that they
are worthless and shameful. This hypothesis regarding the entrenchment of these mechanisms
is highly consistent with the CBT model of PDs, which postulates that learning is the pro-
cess through which coping strategies become ﬁxed, inﬂexible, and over-/underdeveloped in
patients with PDs (Davidson, 2007). In light of the above, what is the evidence that this pathol-
ogy of inference underlies psychopathy?
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF PSYCHOPATHY
In this section, we examine how the Bayesian model of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing is
supported by existing structural and functional neuroimaging studies on psychopathy in adult
samples of highly psychopathic individuals. This section focuses on neuroimaging studies, be-
cause neuroimaging is one of the most direct (noninvasive) methods for examining the neuro-
biology of psychopathology in humans. While there are some core neural abnormalities across
studies, it has been noted in prior reviews that some ﬁndings are variable (Del Casale et al.,
2015; Koenigs, 2012; Koenigs, Baskin-Sommers, Zeier, & Newman, 2011; Seara-Cardoso &
Viding, 2015). This variability is likely due to factors such as differences in sample sizes,
paradigms, and comparison groups. The sample sizes of some studies of highly psychopathic
individuals are comparatively small. Furthermore, neural processing abnormalities observed in
psychopathy are at times inﬂuenced by the paradigm researchers have used (e.g., a region may
be hypo- or hyperactive depending on the task and/or stimuli). Some studies, however, do not
use equivalent paradigms or consistent criteria to identify “psychopaths,” which makes it more
difﬁcult to compare across samples. Some studies also use different comparison groups (e.g.,
healthy controls, offenders with low-levels of psychopathic traits) and/or do not match groups
on relevant confounding variables (e.g., IQ). Aggregated trait scores (e.g., PCL–R total, factor
and facet scores) are typically used to identify and compare groups and/or correlate symptom
severity with neural abnormalities, which limits our ability to link neural abnormalities to spe-
ciﬁc personality traits. Finally, the number of neuroimaging studies of psychopathy performed
to date is small compared to other forms of psychopathology (e.g., schizophrenia, depression),
and thus inferences from the extant neuroimaging data should be considered tentative and will
require further empirical investigation (Koenigs et al., 2011).
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With these qualiﬁcations in mind, it is also important to note that the ﬁeld has grown
immensely in recent years and there are some highly suggestive neuronal abnormalities as-
sociated with psychopathy. Crucially, these ﬁndings are consistent with the Bayesian model
of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing. Reviews of the structural MRI, resting-state functional
connectivity MRI (rs-fcMRI) and task-based fMRI (t-fMRI) studies of patients with psychopathy
suggest that a number of neural networks involving frontal, limbic, and paralimbic structures
are disturbed in psychopathy (N. E. Anderson & Kiehl, 2012; Blair, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2013;
Del Casale et al., 2015; Kiehl, 2006; Koenigs, 2012; Koenigs et al., 2011; Seara-Cardoso &
Viding, 2015). We focus on neural network abnormalities in the amygdala–ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (vmPFC)4 network. It is important to note at the outset that Blair (2007, 2008,
2010, 2013) has argued for many years that a core neural abnormality characterizing psy-
chopathy involves dysfunction along the amygdala–vmPFC network. Thus the neurobiological
implementation of the Bayesian model we outline in what follows is consistent with the frame-
work developed by Blair (2007, 2008, 2010, 2013).
Review of Neuroimaging Research
Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) studies of psychopaths provide a window into the abnormali-
ties in the amygdala–vmPFC network. DTI allows researchers to reconstruct in vivo the white
matter (WM) tracts connecting brain regions and to evaluate certain aspects of its microstruc-
ture. Six DTI studies comparing psychopaths with matched controls found reduced WM struc-
tural integrity in the uncinate fasciculus (Craig et al., 2009; Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2013;
Jiang et al., 2017; Motzkin, Newman, Kiehl, & Koenigs, 2011; Sundram et al., 2012; Waller,
Dotterer, Murray, Maxwell, & Hyde, 2017; Wolf et al., 2015). The uncinate fasciculus is a
bidirectional hook-shaped tract with ﬁbers that connect the temporal pole (TP; Brodmann area
[BA] 38/20), entorhinal cortex (ERC; BA 28/34), perirhinal cortex (PRC; BA 35/36), parahip-
pocampal cortex (PHC; BA 36), and amygdala to regions of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex
(lOFC; BA 11/47), vmPFC (BA 11/32), and rostromedial PFC (rmPFC; BA 10; Schmahmann &
Pandya, 2006; Schmahmann et al., 2007; Thiebaut de Schotten, Dell’Acqua, Valabregue, &
Catani, 2012; Von Der Heide, Skipper, Klobusicky, & Olson, 2013). The uncinate fasciculus
ﬁbers split when they enter the frontal region into a larger ventro-lateral branch and a smaller
anterior-medial branch (Catani, Howard, Pajevic, & Jones, 2002). The ventro-lateral branch
terminates in the lOFC, whereas the antero-medial branch terminates in rmPFC. Crucially,
rs-fcMRI studies of psychopaths mirror this structural connectivity deﬁcit: psychopaths also
show reduced functional connectivity between the amygdala and vmPFC at rest (Motzkin
et al., 2011), while passively watching scenes depicting moral violations (Yoder, Harenski,
Kiehl, & Decety, 2015), and while imagining others in pain (Decety, Chen, Harenski, & Kiehl,
2013) compared to age, gender, and IQmatched controls, though one study found that this de-
coupling was more dorsal in the mPFC (Contreras-Rodríguez et al., 2015). Furthermore, struc-
tural brain changes associated with psychopathy overlap with the brain regions connected by
the uncinate fasciculus. For instance, psychopathy is associated with signiﬁcant reductions in
gray matter volume (GMV), gray matter density (GMD), and/or cortical thickness in the rmPFC,
4 The anatomical deﬁnition of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and its sub-regions varies between studies.
In this article, the mPFC refers to the entire medial section of the PFC, including sections of the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC). The ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) encompasses the ventral portion of the mPFC, including the medial
orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), which corresponds to the medial sections of Brodmann area (BA) 11, 25, and
lower section of BA 32. The dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC) encompasses the dorsal portion of the mPFC, which
corresponds to the medial sections of BA 8, 9 and the upper section of BA 32. The rostromedial PFC (rmPFC)
encompasses the most anterior pole of the mPFC (BA 10).
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vmPFC, lOFC, amygdala,5 TP, PHC, ERC, and PRC (Boccardi et al., 2011; Contreras-Rodríguez
et al., 2015; de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; Ermer, Cope, Nyalakanti, Calhoun, & Kiehl, 2012;
Gregory et al., 2012; Ly et al., 2012; Müller et al., 2008; Yang, Raine, Colletti, Toga, & Narr,
2009, 2010; Yang, Raine, Narr, Colleti & Toga, 2009).
By linking these abnormalities to the amygdala–vmPFC network’s normal functions, we
can understand the signiﬁcance of these results in relation to the Bayesian model described
in the section “A Bayesian Account of Psychopathy.” The amygdala is a complex collection
of nuclei with extensive connections with cortical and subcortical structures. The amygdala
receives inputs from all sensory modalities and has mainly unidirectional output projections
to the striatum and rich bidirectional connections with the mPFC, OFC, medial temporal lobe
(MTL; i.e., ERC, PRC, PHC, hippocampus), TP, thalamus, hypothalamus, and brain stem (Freese
& Amaral, 2005; Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002; Ghashghaei, Hilgetag, & Barbas, 2007; Janak &
Tye, 2015; McDonald, 1998; Sah, Faber, De Armentia, & Power, 2003). Early accounts of the
amygdala linked it principally to fear-related processing; however, a great amount of evidence
now suggests that this is a simpliﬁcation, for the amygdala is involved in affective processing,
social behavior, and reward learning. What appears to unify these functions is that the amyg-
dala provides a basic signal of the “salience,” “affective signiﬁcance” or “value” of sensory
information and semantic/episodic/autobiographical memory representations stored in the
TP and MTL (Binder & Desai, 2011; Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013; Olson, McCoy,
Klobusicky, & Ross, 2013; Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004), and this information is then trans-
mitted to higher-cortical areas, particularly the vmPFC and lOFC, for hierarchically deeper or
more elaborate processing (Adolphs, 2010; Balleine & Killcross, 2006; Baxter & Murray, 2002;
Janak & Tye, 2015; Morrison & Salzman, 2010; Murray, 2007). In the context of active infer-
ence, salient information that is transmitted to higher levels in the hierarchy corresponds to in-
formation that is afforded greater precision. Similarly, the “rewarding” aspects of a cue entail
greater precision or confidence about the consequences of action (Friston, Schwartenbeck et al.,
2014). We will therefore use salience, reward, and precision interchangeably in this article.
DTI and neuropsychological research has strongly suggested that this transmission of af-
fective salience-tagged (i.e., high precision) mnemonic and sensory information to the vmPFC/
lOFC is one of the core functions of the uncinate fasciculus (Von Der Heide et al., 2013). The
bidirectional nature of the uncinate fasciculus means that the vmPFC/lOFC can also modify the
affective signiﬁcance of these representations (e.g., by furnishing prior biases or predictions),
which is consistent with the fact that the vmPFC is implicated in emotion regulation and fear
extinction (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011; Schiller & Delgado, 2010).
The vmPFC and lOFC therefore play a central role in this network. Their different patterns
of anatomical connectivity with cortical and subcortical structures provide clues concerning
their different functions (Bandler, Keay, Floyd, & Price, 2000; Barbas & Pandya, 1989;
Carmichael & Price, 1995a, 1995b; Haber, 2016; Noonan, Kolling, Walton, & Rushworth,
2012; Öngür & Price, 2000; Price, 2007; Rudebeck & Murray, 2011; Saleem, Kondo, & Price,
2008; Saleem, Miller, & Price, 2014; Wallis, 2007). The vmPFC and lOFC are densely intercon-
nected with each other and have bidirectional connections with the amygdala, hippocampus,
ERC, PRC, PHC, TP, mediodorsal thalamus (MD), and lateral PFC. However, there are a number
of notable differences: The vmPFC has bidirectional connections with the posterior cingulate
5 Research suggests that the association between psychopathy and amygdala volumes is complex. Speciﬁcally,
some amygdala nuclei are associated with volumetric reductions in patients with psychopathy, whereas other
nuclei are associated with enlargement (Boccardi et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2010; Yang, Raine, Narr et al., 2009).
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cortex (PCC) and retrosplenial cortex (Rsp), which is not apparent in the lOFC. Furthermore, the
lOFC receives inputs from visual, olfactory, gustatory, and somatosensory modalities, whereas
the vmPFC receives relatively few direct sensory inputs. These anatomical differences are con-
sistent with the fact that the vmPFC is a central hub in the default mode network (DMN)6 and
thus plays a central role in internal mentation and self-related processing (Andrews-Hanna,
2012; Martinelli et al., 2013; Northoff et al., 2006; Qin & Northoff, 2011). Finally, although
both regions project to the striatum (primarily the ventral striatum), only the vmPFC sends out-
puts to the hypothalamus and periaqueductal gray (PAG). This allows the vmPFC to potentially
modulate a wide range of basic physiological functions mediated by the hypothalamus and
PAG: pain modulation, fear/anxiety, stress response, ﬁght–ﬂight response, sleep–wake cycle,
sexual/parental behaviors, energy metabolism, body temperature, blood pressure/electrolyte
composition, and the autonomic nervous system (Benarroch, 2012; Kandel, Schwartz, Jessell,
Siegelbaum, & Hudspeth, 2013). In terms of the Bayesian brain, this functional anatomy is
associated with interoceptive inference and providing predictions that engage autonomic re-
ﬂexes that are essential for afﬁliative, prosocial, and other actions (Barrett & Simmons, 2015;
Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Friston, 2015; Seth, 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016).
While the lOFC and vmPFC are both implicated in value-based processing and decision-
making, research suggests that their functions are distinct (for reviews, see Kable & Glimcher,
2009; Levy & Glimcher, 2012; Noonan et al., 2012; Peters & Büchel, 2010; Rangel & Hare,
2010; Rudebeck &Murray, 2011; Sescousse, Caldú, Segura, &Dreher, 2013; Stalnaker, Cooch,
& Schoenbaum, 2015). Although there are still many unanswered questions, the lOFC appears
to be involved in learning and assigning value/salience to speciﬁc stimuli based on their asso-
ciation with speciﬁc reward outcomes, whereas the vmPFC encodes the expected subjective
value of various stimuli into a continuous “common currency” to determine which is most
salient/signiﬁcant/precise. Speciﬁcally, the vmPFC encodes the expected values of various
types of information, which can be applied not only to stimuli from the external environment,
but also internally generated, self-related mental contents in order represent the personal
signiﬁcance/salience of this information along a continuum (for a review, see D’Argembeau,
2013). The encoding of the expected value of internal/external stimuli (i.e., “valuation”) by
the vmPFC is believed to not only facilitate the comparison among options in order to choose
the most signiﬁcant/salient option during decision-making (Kable & Glimcher, 2009; Levy &
Glimcher, 2012; Peters & Büchel, 2010), but it is also hypothesized that valuation is essential
for constructing a coherent self-representation (D’Argembeau, 2013).
The anatomical connectivity of the lOFC/vmPFC is consistent with this functional dif-
ferentiation (Rudebeck & Murray, 2011). Speciﬁcally, the connections between the lOFC and
visual, olfactory, gustatory, and somatosensory regions, as well as amygdala and MTL, means
that the lOFC is in an ideal anatomical position to construct a high-dimensional representation
of the values of speciﬁc stimuli using information about their sensory, memory, and affective
6 The default mode network (DMN) consists of a network of regions that show increased, synchronized activity
during states when the brain is at rest compared to active, externally directed tasks (Greicius, Supekar, Menon,
& Dougherty, 2009; Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Raichle, 2015; Shulman et al., 1997). While there is still de-
bate over the precise function of the DMN, it appears to support internal mentation, i.e., stimulus-independent,
task-unrelated thought (Andrews-Hanna, 2012). The DMN regions include the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex, (vmPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), precuneus (pC), inferior
parietal lobule (IPL), temporal parietal junction (TPJ), lateral temporal cortex (LTC), temporal pole (TP), retrosple-
nial cortex (Rsp), entorhinal cortex (ERC), parahippocampal cortex (PHC), and hippocampus (Andrews-Hanna,
2012; Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010; Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter,
2008).
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components. Similarly, the connections between vmPFC and amygdala, MTL, and lOFC mean
that the vmPFC is in an ideal anatomical position to integrate multiple value signals into a one-
dimensional representation (“common currency”) of expected value (e.g., the complex value
representations from the lOFC and themore basic salience-tagged memory representations and
sensory information conveyed along the uncinate fasciculus). Finally, it has been hypothesized
that the lateral PFC has complex interactions with the lOFC and vmPFC (Kable & Glimcher,
2009; Northoff et al., 2006; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Wallis, 2007). Speciﬁcally, the lateral PFC
may exert top-down modulation of the value-based processes performed by the lOFC/vmPFC,
selecting and ﬁltering among the set of options generated by the vmPFC/lOFC.
As illustrated in Figure 6, the amygdala–vmPFC network provides a possible neurobio-
logical implementation of the computational architecture underlying lacks remorse and self-
aggrandizing described in the section “A Bayesian Account of Psychopathy.” In this model, the
trait of lacks remorse reﬂects a tendency to down-regulate negative self-related processing (e.g.,
feelings of shame/worthlessness), whichwe proposewould be associated with diminished con-
nectivity between the amygdala and vmPFC along the uncinate fasciculus. In predictive coding
terms, this would correspond to an attenuation of (the precision of) prediction errors ascending
from the amygdala that would normally inform and update self-representations in the vmPFC.
These representations (i.e., expectations) would normally integrate affective, prosocial, and
interoceptive cues with those based on representations encoded in the MTL through the as-
similation of ascending prediction errors conveyed by ascending connections in the uncinate
fasciculus.
While no studies have directly correlated trait-level facets of psychopathy with func-
tional connectivity patterns, studies have found that psychopathy in general is associated with
reduced functional connectivity between the amygdala and vmPFC (Decety, Chen et al., 2013;
Motzkin et al., 2011; Yoder et al., 2015). Over time, this functional de-coupling could lead
to a structural de-coupling, which is consistent with DTI studies reporting that psychopathy is
associated with reduced WM structural integrity in the uncinate fasciculus (Craig et al., 2009;
Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2017; Motzkin et al., 2011; Sundram et al., 2012;
Waller et al., 2017; Wolf et al., 2015). Accordingly, this model predicts that a person’s score for
lacks remorse should be inversely correlated to the strength of amygdala–vmPFC connectivity.
Furthermore, this de-coupling between the amygdala and vmPFC is consistent with numerous
t-fMRI studies which have demonstrated that psychopathy is associated with less activation
in these structures in response to negative stimuli. For instance, psychopaths show reduced
activation of the amygdala and/or vmPFC while perceiving others’ pain (Decety, Skelly, &
Kiehl, 2013), imagining others in pain (Decety, Chen et al., 2013), viewing others’ facial ex-
pressions of fear, sadness, and pain (Decety, Skelly, Yoder, & Kiehl, 2014; Dolan & Fullam,
2009), during a recognition memory task for negative affective words (Kiehl et al., 2001), dur-
ing aversive conditioning (Birbaumer et al., 2005; Schneider et al., 2000; Veit et al., 2002), and
during emotional moral processing (Fede et al., 2016; Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009; Harenski,
Harenski, Shane, & Kiehl, 2010; Yoder et al., 2015). The trait lacks remorse can therefore be
understood as emerging from the increasing functional and structural de-coupling between
the amygdala and vmPFC, which attenuates the negative affective salience-tagged self-related
memory representations and sensory information (i.e., prediction errors) transmitted along the
uncinate fasciculus. This attenuation or de-coupling effectively cuts off the vmPFC from inte-
grating affective information into the representation the vmPFC is constructing of the expected
value of self-related mental constructs (i.e., posterior expectations). This is highly consistent
with the Bayesian formulation of lacks remorse described earlier, which characterizes this
personality trait as an attenuation of the precision of the ascending prediction errors arising
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Figure 6. A neurobiological implementation of the Bayesian model of lacks remorse and self-
aggrandizing. The internal working model (IWM) of the self consists of semantic, episodic, and
autobiographical memory representations stored in the TP/MTL. Self-related sensory information
from the external environment and social interactions are interpreted through the representations
of the IWM of the self. The amygdala provides a basic signal of affective signiﬁcance to the self-
related sensory/mnemonic information stored in the TP/MTL. The amygdala thus encodes affective
and interoceptive expectations that contextualize this information. The self-related information in
the TP/MTL is transmitted to the vmPFC along the uncinate fasciculus. The vmPFC integrates these
signals with ascending prediction errors from the amygdala to update an integrated representation
of the expected value of the self-related information it is receiving. The vmPFC self-representation
may then modulate hypothalamic and PAG activity to elicit basic physiological responses (e.g.,
via autonomic reﬂexes). Reduced amygdala–vmPFC connectivity leads to lacks remorse, attenuat-
ing the negative affective and interoceptive information transmitted along the uncinate fasciculus.
Self-aggrandizing reﬂects the augmentation of positive self-related information in response to the
reduced vmPFC–ventral striatum connectivity, which impairs the integration of self-representations
with signals of positive affect and reward mediated by the ventral striatum. See main text for details.
TP=temporal pole; MTL=medial temporal lobe; PAG=periaqueductal gray; vmPFC=ventromedial
prefrontal cortex.
from the patient’s IWM, which decreases the inﬂuence of negative affective inputs on the pa-
tient’s posterior expectations about their self (Figure 3). In this way, we can understand the pos-
sible neurobiological implementation of the Bayesian architecture underlying lacks remorse.
Given that the vmPFC modulates activity in the hypothalamus and PAG (Figure 6), this
may also explain well-established physiological ﬁndings associated with psychopathy.
Meta-analytic evidence shows that psychopathy is associated with signiﬁcantly lower elec-
trodermal activity at rest, during a task, in response to negative stimuli (e.g., anger provoking,
painful, or aversive stimuli), and as a change from baseline (Lorber, 2004). This blunting of
sympathetic nervous system (SNS) activity is consistent with the neurobiology of psychopathy
and the attenuation of affectively charged prediction errors (see Stephan et al., 2016, for a
related discussion of interoceptive inference in the context of fatigue and depression). Speciﬁ-
cally, one would predict from the amygdala-vmPFC de-coupling associated with psychopathy
that the basic affective signals transmitted along the uncinate fasciculus would not only fail
to inﬂuence the valuation processes in the vmPFC, but also brain regions modulated by the
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vmPFC, such as the hypothalamus and PAG, which can regulate SNS activity (Benarroch, 2012;
Kandel et al., 2013; Seth & Friston, 2016; Stephan et al., 2016). Such physiological ﬁndings
are consistent with the hypothesis put toward in this article that lacks remorse is generated by
a discounting of affective information, which is mediated by amygdala-vmPFC de-coupling
along the uncinate fasciculus.
Although more speculative, there is reason to believe that self-aggrandizing may be asso-
ciated with a frontostriatal circuit involving the vmPFC and ventral striatum. In support of this
proposal, there is evidence that self-esteem is related to frontostriatal connectivity. Speciﬁcally,
trait self-esteem is related to increased WM structural integrity between ventral striatum and
mPFC (including vmPFC), whereas state self-esteem is related to increased functional connec-
tivity along this circuit (Chavez & Heatherton, 2015). The authors of this study hypothesized
that frontostriatal connectivity may reﬂect an integration of self-representations encoded in
the vmPFC with positive affect and reward/precision signals mediated by the ventral stria-
tum (Haber, 2016). Interestingly, the “superiority illusion”—the cognitive bias reﬂected in
people tending to evaluate themselves as superior to average—is associated with resting-state
functional connectivity between the mPFC and striatum, which was found to be regulated
by inhibitory dopaminergic neurotransmission (Yamada et al., 2013). Most relevant to self-
aggrandizing is the ﬁnding that grandiose narcissism is associated with reduced frontostriatal
WM structural integrity between the vmPFC and ventral striatum (Chester, Lynam, Powell,
& DeWall, 2016), which is the opposite of individuals with high trait self-esteem (Chavez
& Heatherton, 2015). The authors of this study hypothesized that grandiosity may reﬂect a
mechanism that compensates for this neural deﬁcit in the circuitry that connects the brain’s
reward systems (i.e., sources of neuromodulatory precision setting projections) with its self-
representations, such that grandiose individuals have a low “baseline” self-reward connectivity.
The neural regions involved in compensating for this low baseline by abnormally increasing a
person’s self-appraisal are unknown and likely involve multiple interacting systems. One likely
neural system is the lateral PFC, which can inﬂuence valuation and self-referential processes in
the vmPFC via top-down modulation (Kable & Glimcher, 2009; Northoff et al., 2006; Rangel
& Hare, 2010; Wallis, 2007). While more research is needed, the emerging neuroimaging
evidence on grandiosity is consistent with the Bayesian model of self-aggrandizing described
earlier, which characterizes this trait as compensatory prior beliefs (i.e., intermediate beliefs)
about the self (i.e., a defense mechanism), which upregulates positive self-related informa-
tion in the face of low baseline self-worth (e.g., feelings of shame/worthlessness), resulting in
abnormally elevated self-appraisal.
Putting It All Together
Taken together, while the neuroimaging literature to date is small, the computational architec-
ture depicted in Figure 3 can be mapped onto the neural network associated with psychopathy
depicted in Figure 6. The vmPFC corresponds approximately to the intermediate level of the
architecture (Figure 3), which encodes the conscious posterior expectations about the self,
which is generated by integrating descending top-down prior predictions about the self with
ascending prediction error signals from regions supplying other information about the self.
This hypothesis that the vmPFC plays a central role in the automatic conscious thoughts about
the self in psychopathy is in keeping with the fact that the vmPFC is a central hub in large-
scale brain networks that mediate internal mentation and self-related processing (Andrews-
Hanna, 2012; Martinelli et al., 2013; Northoff et al., 2006; Qin & Northoff, 2011). The neural
regions underlying the high-level prior beliefs encoded in the top level of Figure 3 are cur-
rently unknown, though the lateral PFC is likely a key neural system mediating these top-down
Computational Psychiatry 120
Model of Lacks Remorse and Self-Aggrandizing Prosser et al.
predictions by virtue of the fact that it can exert conscious top-down modulation of valuation
and self-referential processes in the vmPFC (Kable & Glimcher, 2009; Northoff et al., 2006;
Rangel & Hare, 2010; Wallis, 2007). The IWM of the self consists of semantic, episodic, and
autobiographical memory representations stored in the TP/MTL, with the amygdala providing
a basic signal of affective signiﬁcance to the self-related information stored in these regions.
This self-related information is transmitted to the vmPFC along the uncinate fasciculus. Thus
the uncinate fasciculus corresponds approximately to the ascending connections to the inter-
mediate layer, and the TP/MTL–amygdala network corresponds approximately to the bottom
level of the network representing the contents of the IWM of the self (Figure 3).
It is for this reason that we hypothesize that lacks remorse is mediated by functional
and structural de-coupling between the amygdala and vmPFC along the uncinate fasciculus,
which effectively cuts off the vmPFC from integrating information from lower levels in the hi-
erarchy (i.e., the IWM of the self) into the posterior expectations it is forming about the self.
Given the present state of affairs on the neuroimaging of psychopathy, it is more difﬁcult to
make such close links between the computational architecture underlying self-aggrandizing
and the neural networks associated with psychopathy. Recall that Figure 3 hypothesizes that
self-aggrandizing is mediated by top-down predictions supplied by priors from higher levels
in the hierarchy, which modulate the conscious posterior expectations of the self encoded at
the intermediate level. As outlined in the preceding review, this speciﬁc hypothesis has not
yet been tested in the neuroimaging literature. This is because there are no studies to date
speciﬁcally investigating the link between psychopathy and the brain regions that likely medi-
ate such top-down predictions on the vmPFC during self-related processing (e.g., lateral PFC).
That said, the literature to date has suggested that frontostriatal dysconnectivity, which nor-
mally connects the brain’s conscious self-representations in the vmPFC with the brain’s reward
systems, may contribute to the negative core self-image characteristic of patients with the trait
self-aggrandizing. This is compensated for via other brain regions, which we hypothesize the
lateral PFC being key among them.
Therefore, based on the emerging neuroimaging research reviewed earlier, it appears that
there are at least two, potentially overlapping, pathways that mediate the “undefended” nega-
tive core self-image underlying lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing (Figure 3A). The ﬁrst is the
amygdala–vmPFC connectivity along the uncinate fasciculus. The second is the frontostriatal
dysconnectivity. While there are at least two pathways, the net effect on self-representations in
the vmPFC appears to be the same. Speciﬁcally, in the absence of a compensatory de-coupling
between the amygdala–vmPFC network (i.e., an undefended state), the psychopathic patient’s
amygdala–vmPFC connectivity increases the likelihood that vmPFC self-representations will
be inﬂuenced by the negative affective salience-tagged self-related memory representations
and sensory information transmitted along the uncinate fasciculus. Similarly, in the absence
of a compensatory up-regulation of self-related information in the vmPFC (i.e., an undefended
state), the psychopathic patient’s frontostriatal dysconnectivity increases the likelihood that
vmPFC self-representations will not be integrated with positive affective and reward signals
mediated by the ventral striatum. Thus, in both cases, vmPFC self-representations are char-
acterized by negative affective predictions in the absence of compensatory (defense) mech-
anisms, by virtue of either the presence of negative affective signals from lower level brain
regions (i.e., amygdala–vmPFC connectivity) or the absence of positive affective/reward sig-
nals from the ventral striatum (i.e., frontostriatal dysconnectivity).
One unanswered question is whether or not these pathways are present in both
lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing, or whether they represent different neurobiological
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instantiations of the computational architecture outlined in Figure 3. That is to say, the
undefended state in lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing could be mediated both by amygdala–
vmPFC connectivity and frontostriatal dysconnectivity, or the pathways may be unique to each
trait (e.g., the negative core self-image in self-aggrandizing may be mediated uniquely by fron-
tostriatal dysconnectivity, whereas the negative core self-image in lacks remorse may be me-
diated uniquely by amygdala–vmPFC connectivity). Relatedly, it may be that self-aggrandizing
and lacks remorse are both associated with defensive de-coupling between the amygdala–
vmPFC along the uncinate fasciculus. This would be consistent with our model, given that
both are defensive responses to negative self-related information. However, the present state
of psychopathy neuroimaging research does not provide ﬁrm answers to these questions. This
is because there has not yet been an analysis of structural or functional neuroimaging data
examining the relationship between the traits lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing and these
two pathways in the same sample of psychopathic patients. Such a study would help shed
light on these hypotheses regarding the neurobiological instantiation of the undefended nega-
tive core self-image underlying lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing and the neural circuitry of
these defense mechanisms.
DISCUSSION
While by no means the last word on these topics, we believe that the computational archi-
tecture (Figure 3), quantitative simulations (Figures 4 and 5), and neuroimaging research on
psychopathy (Figure 6) provide a working formal model of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing
as a form of abnormal Bayesian inference about the self. Furthermore, we believe that this
formal model provides a computational neuroscientiﬁc basis for the integrated psychothera-
peutic model of these traits which cognitive and psychodynamic theories have converged on
(see the section “Toward an Integrated Psychotherapeutic Model of Psychopathy”). That being
said, there are a number of limitations of the model we have proposed, some of which are
intrinsic to the model outlined herein, and others are a consequence of the limitations in the
current state of affairs in psychopathy research.
The model is limited, ﬁrst, because it has provided an explanatory framework only for
traits lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing. However, there are many other psychopathic traits
(Table 1), and these require an explanation in terms of Bayesian inference for this model to be
a sufﬁciently comprehensive model of psychopathy. Second, the model has not speciﬁed the
precise neuromodulatory mechanisms controlling the precision of prior beliefs and bottom-up
evidence (from the IWMof the self) on automatic thoughts about the self. Furthermore, as men-
tioned, there is uncertainty regarding the neural correlates of the high-level prior beliefs that
up-regulate self-related information in response to frontostriatal dysconnectivity. This means
that we do not yet have a direct mapping of this component of the computational architec-
ture (Figure 3) onto the neurobiology of psychopathy, though there are likely candidate neural
systems (i.e., the lateral PFC). Similarly, as described earlier, it is at present uncertain whether
frontostriatal dysconnectivity is unique to self-aggrandizing, or whether it also contributes to
the negative affective self-image in lacks remorse.
There are other limitations that stem more from limitations inherent in the current state of
affairs in psychopathy research. Chief among them is the fact that the neuroimaging literature
on psychopathy to date is small compared to other forms of psychopathology, and thus infer-
ences from this literature should be considered tentative and will require further conﬁrmation
(Koenigs et al., 2011). Along the same lines, we know very little about the neurochemical
basis of the psychopathic traits covered in this article. There are at least two reasons for this.
First, psychopathy, and PDs more generally, are extremely complex clinical phenomena, and
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there are currently no plausible translational animal models of psychopathy, especially the
core Antagonism traits. While there are undoubtedly animal models of Disinhibition traits
(e.g., impulsivity), these are not the core features of the psychopathic personality (Poythress
& Hall, 2011; Skeem & Cooke, 2010). In the absence of plausible translational models, PET
imaging is the gold standard for examining in vivo neurochemical disturbances associated with
psychiatric diseases in humans. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one
PET imaging study to date using an adult sample of highly psychopathic individuals, however,
this study focused speciﬁcally on impulsivity and not Antagonism traits (Kolla et al., 2015).
This is the second reason for our limited understanding of the neuromodulatory mechanisms
underlying psychopathy. In short, we simply do not know as much about the neurobiological
basis of psychopathic traits as we do about, for example, schizophrenia or depression. This
places an upper limit on our ability to provide a detailed model of the neurobiological circuitry
underlying lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing. Finally, another major limitation in the ﬁeld
is that aggregated trait scores (e.g., PCL–R total, factor and facet scores) are typically used in
neuroimaging studies. In our view, this is a signiﬁcant methodological and analytic problem.
This is because it limits the ﬁeld’s ability to link neural abnormalities to speciﬁc psychopathic
traits. It is for this reason that we had to make indirect links between the neuroimaging ﬁndings
and the speciﬁc traits of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing. Therefore, the ﬁeld would bene-
ﬁt immensely from either new neuroimaging studies that analyze the data at the trait-level, or
even reanalyses of older datasets to investigate the associations between speciﬁc psychopathic
traits and brain structure/function.
Treatment Implications: Integrated Modular Treatment for Psychopathy
A full discussion of the treatment implications of the Bayesian model, and the integrated psy-
chotherapeutic model more generally, extends beyond the scope of this article. That being said,
an outline of the treatment implications is possible. The etiological framework of our Bayesian
model resonates with major trends in how some clinicians are beginning to conceptualize
the treatment of PDs. Over the past number of years, there has been a growing appreciation
that specialized therapies rooted in speciﬁc “schools” of psychotherapy (e.g., CBT vs. SFT vs.
dialectical behavior therapy vs. transference-focused psychotherapy vs. mentalization-based
treatment) tailored to speciﬁc diagnostic categories may not be the most effective strategy for
treating PD. Rather, it may be more effective to utilize an integrated approach to PD treatment.
It is for this reason that the integrated modular treatment (IMT) was developed (Clarkin, Cain,
& Livesley, 2015; Livesley, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2012; Livesley, Dimaggio, & Clarkin,
2016). Our model resonates closely with the IMT and its integrated approach to PD treatment.
Before summarizing the IMT and how our model ﬁts into this framework, it is necessary to
outline the three major reasons for shifting toward an integrated approach to PD treatment: (a)
the evidence for “common factors,” (b) the utility of technical eclecticism, and (c) the evidence
for theoretical integration across schools of psychotherapy (Livesley et al., 2016).
The ﬁrst reason is the evidence for common factors across therapies. This is the ﬁnding
that there are few clinically signiﬁcant differences in the efﬁcacy across psychotherapies for
PD, including general psychiatric management and supportive psychotherapy (Budge et al.,
2013; Clarkin, Levy, Lenzenweger, & Kernberg, 2007; Cristea et al., 2017; Leichsenring &
Leibing, 2003; McMain et al., 2009). Although there are sometimes differences in outcome
between studies, they are often small and/or difﬁcult to interpret because they rarely demon-
strate clear superiority of one specialized therapy from a particular “school” over another
in head-to-head comparisons. The lack of evidence for clinically signiﬁcant differences in
outcome across therapies is seen in studies of treatments for borderline PD (Cristea et al., 2017)
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and antisociality (Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005; Lipsey, Landenberger, & Wilson, 2007). Of
course, this is not surprising at all. It was pointed out as early as the 1930s by Rosenzweig
that there are a set of “common factors” that underlie all bona ﬁde psychotherapies, and these
general change mechanisms common to all therapies for PD explain the equivalent efﬁcacy
across treatments (Rosenzweig, 1936). Indeed, there is now compelling evidence from the
general psychotherapy literature that there is a set of common factors shared across special-
ized therapies that together account for a large proportion (at least 50%) of the variance in
positive outcome (Horvath & Symonds, 1991; Luborsky, Singer, & Luborsky, 1975; Luborsky
et al., 2002; Marcus, O’Connell, Norris, & Sawaqdeh, 2014; Martin, Garske, & Davis, 2000;
Wampold, 2001). What are these general change mechanisms? Lists of these common fac-
tors sometimes differ; however, the common factors can be grouped into six general change
mechanisms (Livesley et al., 2016):
1. Structure. Establish a highly structured treatment process that deﬁnes the therapeu-
tic stance (i.e., therapist provides support, empathy, and validation) and establishes an
explicit treatment contract that deﬁnes the purpose, format, terms, and limits (e.g.,
treatment boundaries) of the therapy.
2. Treatment alliance. Establish and maintain a collaborative treatment alliance.
3. Consistency. Maintain a consistent treatment process by adhering to the treatment
structure (i.e., the therapeutic stance and treatment contract).
4. Validation. The therapist promotes validation by recognizing and afﬁrming the legiti-
macy of the patient’s experience (i.e., that the patient’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior
make sense and are understandable).
5. Motivation. Build motivation and commitment to change.
6. Meta-cognition. Promote self-observation, self-knowledge, and self-reﬂection.
In commenting on the causal role of common factors in psychotherapy, Markowitz (2014) has
underscored the following paradox: “if you cannot do this [i.e., deliver the common factors],
the rest of psychotherapy does not matter”; however, “if you can do this, the rest of psychother-
apy does not matter [because the majority of the causal ingredients linked to positive outcome
are provided by these general change mechanisms]” (pp. 287–288, emphasis original).
The evidence for common factors, however, does not preclude the possibility that spe-
ciﬁc interventions unique to specialized therapies may contribute to positive outcomes in PD,
independent of general change mechanisms. In other words, there may also be speciﬁc change
mechanisms required for speciﬁc types of dysfunction, and thus speciﬁc interventions may be
required for the unique problems seen in particular patients. Those therapies that contain these
“speciﬁc ingredients” (i.e., speciﬁc interventions) will show superior efﬁcacy to those that do
not. The empirical literature suggests that this may indeed be the case. Meta-analytic evidence
suggests that acute symptoms may respond better to more structured cognitive-behavioral
techniques than less structured psychodynamic techniques (Marcus et al., 2014). Conversely,
psychodynamic techniques may bemore effective for increasing self-reﬂection relative to struc-
tured cognitive-behavioral techniques (Livesley et al., 2016). Similarly, in the realm of reha-
bilitation for people involved in the criminal justice system, structured cognitive-behavioral
techniques are robustly associated with reduced violent/antisocial behavior, whereas generic
interventions are not (Andrews et al., 1990; Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005; Lipsey & Cullen,
2007; Lipsey et al., 2007; McGuire, 2008).
The take home message is that the empirical literature on PD treatment, and psychother-
apy more generally, suggests that effective, evidence-based treatment for PD requires an
Computational Psychiatry 124
Model of Lacks Remorse and Self-Aggrandizing Prosser et al.
integrative “both/and” approach, rather than a tribal “either/or” approach that forces clinicians
to choose between different specialized treatments from different schools of psychotherapy
(Marcus et al., 2014): treatment should both explicitly utilize general treatment interventions
shared across specialized therapies to maximize common factors and explicitly utilize speciﬁc
treatment techniques that have been shown to be effective for speciﬁc types of dysfunction.
This dovetails into the second reason for the IMT approach, which is the utility of tech-
nical eclecticism over ﬁdelity to the prescribed techniques of specialized treatments (Livesley
et al., 2016). This is because specialized treatments often reduce the range of psychopathology
seen in PD to a single primary impairment. For example, the primary impairment in border-
line PD has been explained in terms of (a) affect dysregulation = dialectical behavior therapy,
(b) dysfunctional beliefs = CBT, and (c) deﬁcits in mentalization = mentalization-based ther-
apy (Bateman & Fonagy, 2016; Davidson, 2007; Linehan, 1993). Although simplifying clinical
complexity is helpful, the problem is that such reductions narrow the focus of treatment and
the selection of interventions to only those implied by the underlying theory (e.g., dialecti-
cal behavior therapy focuses on increasing the patient’s affect regulation skills). Specialized
treatments thus risk neglecting other explanatory factors and thus other potentially useful tech-
niques to help treat the diverse range of problems patients face (e.g., patients with borderline
traits have difﬁculties with affect regulation but also maladaptive cognitions, mentalization,
impulse control, self and interpersonal problems, etc.). Technical eclecticism avoids this
theory-imposed restriction by integrating speciﬁc interventions from diverse therapies, with-
out necessarily endorsing all their underlying theoretical constructs, in order to address the full
range of impairment seen in PD.
The third reason for an integrated approach to PD treatment is that the psychotherapeutic
ﬁeld is converging on a number of core ideas about the etiology of PD. A concrete example
of such theoretical integration was described in the section “Toward an Integrated Psychother-
apeutic Model of Psychopathy,” where we saw the convergence of psychodynamic, CBT, and
SFT models of the traits lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing. While often described using
different terminology, almost all current evidence-based psychotherapies for PD emphasize
at least some, and sometimes all, of the following: (a) that the maladaptive thoughts, feel-
ings, and behaviors seen in PD are driven by entrenched cognitive–affective structures (e.g.,
IWM, schemas); (b) that these cognitive–affective structures are often not fully consciously
articulated or accessible (i.e., they are unconscious or partially conscious) yet organize and
inﬂuence a patient’s conscious experiences and behavior; (c) that genetics, learning, develop-
mental factors, and the quality of attachment experiences play central causal roles in shap-
ing these cognitive–affective structures and thus current psychopathology; and (d) that some
of the psychopathology observed in patients with PD is a consequence of the operation of
maladaptive “defense” or “coping” mechanisms that protect against distressing or unaccept-
able thoughts and feelings.
The IMT model is an integrated approach to PD treatment and was developed to explic-
itly address these three issues. The IMT model integrates the treatment principles and methods
that work across therapies, called general treatment modules, with speciﬁc treatment mod-
ules which consist of an eclectic array of speciﬁc interventions, in order to target both the
common and unique features, respectively, of patients with PD (Clarkin et al., 2015;
Livesley, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2012; Livesley et al., 2016). Thus general treatment
modules target the core impairments in self and interpersonal functioning common to all per-
sonality pathology (APA, 2013; Bender et al., 2011; Livesley, 2011; Morey et al., 2015; Morey
et al., 2011; Skodol, 2012, 2014), whereas speciﬁc treatment modules target the unique proﬁle
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of the patient’s pathological personality traits. More speciﬁcally, general treatment modules ex-
plicitly utilize the common factors (i.e., structure, treatment alliance, consistency, validation,
etc.) in order to create a therapeutic process that provides a continuous corrective experi-
ence that treats the core impairments in self/interpersonal functioning. Thus general treatment
modules are used with all patients and throughout treatment. Conversely, speciﬁc treatment
modules are selected from all therapies, based on empirical and rational considerations, to
treat the speciﬁc domains of dysfunction that are the current focus of treatment. In the IMT,
the focus of treatment, and thus the selection of speciﬁc interventions, is determined by the
domains of dysfunction that are currently present in the patient: (a) acute symptoms (e.g., dys-
phoria, rage, self-harm/suicidal behavior, violence), (b) regulation and modulation (e.g., difﬁ-
culty regulating maladaptive thoughts, feelings, and behavior), (c) interpersonal problems (e.g.,
conﬂictual relationships), and (d) self problems (e.g., difﬁculty regulating self-esteem, unstable
and fragmented identity). These four domains of dysfunction imply a hierarchy of treatment foci
(i.e., priority is given to speciﬁc interventions that target acute symptoms when this domain is
present over speciﬁc interventions targeting interpersonal problems). Furthermore, they imply
that patients typically progress, not necessarily linearly, through ﬁve phases of change during
their treatment with the IMT (Clarkin et al., 2015; Livesley, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2012;
Livesley et al., 2016):
Phase 1 of Change: Safety. The primary goal is to ensure the safety of self and others (i.e.,
crisis management). This is done through the general treatment modules of structure,
validation, and support, which often successfully ensure safety in a community setting.
However, sometimes safety cannot be ensured in the community with general change
mechanisms alone—a situation routinely encountered in corrections and forensicmental
health settings. This requires supplementing them with speciﬁc interventions, including
inpatient hospitalization and/or restraints and seclusion.7
Phase 2 of Change: Containment. The primary goal is to contain affective, behavioral,
and cognitive instability. Safety and containment quickly merge into each other dur-
ing crisis management, and likewise involve similar general treatment modules sup-
plemented with speciﬁc interventions consisting of scheduled and/or PRN medications.
During this phase, the treatment alliance and motivation/commitment to change begin
to develop, and a consistent treatment process starts to form between the patient and
their clinician.
Phase 3 of Change: Control and regulation. The primary goal is to increase self-regulation
of maladaptive cognitions, affects, impulses, and behaviors. During this phase, general
change mechanisms continue to build motivation/commitment to change and improve
meta-cognition. These are typically supplemented with speciﬁc cognitive-behavioral
techniques that promote self-regulation in these areas. Medications have limited utility
in treating personality pathology after the containment phase (Khalifa et al., 2010; Lieb,
Völlm, Rücker, Timmer, & Stoffers, 2010).
Phase 4 of Change: Exploration and change. The primary goal is to increase exploration
and modulation of the maladaptive cognitive–affective structures related to interpersonal
problems. General change mechanisms can be supplemented with cognitive-behavioral
7 When using such intensive speciﬁc interventions, it is recommended that (1) they be the least onerous and
least restrictive, (2) duration is determined using a structured evidence-based assessment of risk, with the view
to make them as brief as possible, (3) that due process be in place to protect the patient’s rights, and (4) that
the interventions be implemented, to the greatest extent possible, so as to maximize the patient’s perception of
procedural justice/fairness and minimize their perception of coercion.
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methods and psychodynamic techniques that promote awareness of maladaptive inter-
personal schemas and their origins, and begin to restructure them.
Phase 5 of Change: Integration and synthesis. The primary goal is to construct an adap-
tive sense of self and resolution of interpersonal problems. The transition to this phase
is typically seamless because the process of exploring and resolving interpersonal prob-
lems is intimately tied up with discussions with the patient about issues of identity and
self-direction. General treatment modules are supplemented with speciﬁc interventions
that promote restructuring of maladaptive self-schemas, the formation of an adaptive self-
narrative and coherent sense of self, and the construction of a “personal niche” whereby
the patient can meaningfully engage in work, love, and play.
Therefore, as we can see, general treatment modules are used throughout all phases of
change, and the clinician supplements them with speciﬁc treatment modules tailored to target
the current domain of dysfunction. Thus, Phases 1 and 2 are concerned primarily with treating
acute symptoms, Phase 3 with treating difﬁculties in regulation and modulation, Phase 4 with
treating interpersonal problems, and Phase 5 with treating self problems.
With this basic outline of the IMT unpacked, the treatment implications of our Bayesian
model of psychopathy become apparent and provide the basis for an Integrated Modular
Treatment for Psychopathy. Recall that our model is centered on two hypotheses:
1. Early adverse attachment experiences interact with genetic vulnerabilities to shape the
development of a psychopathic patient’s core self-image (i.e., internal working model of
the self) as worthless and shameful.
2. The traits lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing are compensatory high-level prior beliefs
(i.e., intermediate beliefs) that function as defense mechanisms, allowing the patient
with psychopathy to eliminate or at least diminish (i.e., cope with) the inﬂuence of their
negative core self-image on their conscious experience.
In other words, at the heart of our model is the idea that psychopathy is characterized by a
core impairment in self functioning—namely, deep-seated feelings of worthlessness and shame
arising from the internal working model of the self. This implies that general treatment mod-
ules likely play a primary role in the treatment of psychopathy, because the new experiences
within treatment can provide a continuous corrective experience that challenges these core
beliefs. Speciﬁcally, the core self-image of worthlessness, shame, and inadequacy are chal-
lenged by consistent and regular exposure to experiences with a clinician who (a) is support-
ive, empathic, and validating; (b) shows congruence/genuineness in the relationship; (c) is
carefully attentive to and ﬂexibly resolves ruptures in the treatment alliance; (d) has an atti-
tude toward the patient consisting of collaboration, respect, care, and positive regard; and (e)
models and reinforces, in a nonpunitive, nondevaluing, and nonshaming manner, appropriate
boundaries and prosocial internal standards (Castonguay & Beutler, 2006; Clarkin et al., 2015;
Critchﬁeld & Benjamin, 2006; Livesley, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2012; Livesley et al.,
2016; Mitchell, Tafrate, & Freeman, 2016; Tafrate & Mitchell, 2014). In this way, the general
treatment modules of the IMT for psychopathy function analogously to the SFT concept of
limited re-parenting, which “involves providing, within the appropriate boundaries of the ther-
apy relationship, what patients needed but did not get from their parents as children” (Young
et al., 2003, p. 177). These general treatment modules are likely counterintuitive to people
who have never worked with antisocial individuals. However, as is well known in correc-
tional rehabilitation, a “get tough,” “get real,” or confrontational attitude never works, and is
likely iatrogenic, because it invariably leads to reactance, argumentativeness, disengagement
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and, eventually, shatters theworking relationship and thus the possibility for treatment (Mitchell
et al., 2016; Tafrate & Mitchell, 2014). In short, when it comes to the core of treatment in the
IMT for psychopathy, patients with psychopathy are no different than any other patient with a
PD: The same common factors are utilized and maximized throughout all phases of change.
The second treatment implication of our model is the use of speciﬁc treatment modules
targeting the maladaptive intermediate beliefs (i.e., high-level prior beliefs) of self-aggrandizing
and lacks remorse (i.e., the unique features of the patient). Once patients with psychopathic
traits have transitioned into the control and regulation phase, the focus of speciﬁc interven-
tions should turn to increasing self-regulation of these maladaptive thinking patterns. These
thinking patterns are, in fact, well known in the risk assessment and correctional rehabilita-
tion literatures. Self-aggrandizing and lacks remorse are two instances of a broader class of
cognitions called criminogenic thinking patterns—one of the “Central Eight” strongest, most
robust risk factors for violent and antisocial behavior (Andrews & Bonta, 2010a, 2010b; Bonta
et al., 2014; Gendreau et al., 1996). Criminogenic thinking patterns are attitudes, values, and
beliefs that facilitate violent/antisocial behavior, and are believed to operate at the level of
intermediate beliefs (Mitchell et al., 2016; Seeler, Freeman, DiGiuseppe, & Mitchell, 2014),
which is in keeping with our Bayesian model’s hypotheses (Figure 3). Moreover, given that
criminogenic thinking patterns contribute signiﬁcantly to the harm of others and a wide range
of dysfunction in the patient’s life, almost all evidence-based correctional rehabilitation pro-
grams involve speciﬁc techniques to alter criminogenic thinking, and these techniques involve
standard cognitive-behavioral methods (e.g., identifying automatic thoughts and their associ-
ated intermediate beliefs, increasing awareness of the link between thoughts, emotions, and
behavior, Socratic questioning of beliefs, behavioral experiments, etc.; Lipsey et al., 2007).
Therefore such techniques targeting criminogenic thinking patterns may be crucial modules
for treating the maladaptive cognitions associated with self-aggrandizing and lacks remorse
during Phase 3 of treatment. Such techniques would be part of an eclectic array of speciﬁc
treatment modules used during this phase in order to increase the patient’s self-regulation of
their maladaptive cognitions, affects, impulses, and behaviors.
In summary, our Bayesian model of self-aggrandizing and lacks remorse resonates closely
with the IMT model of PD treatment. For this reason, we have provided a general overview of
a novel Integrated Modular Treatment for Psychopathy which we believe, with further devel-
opment, can provide a fruitful, evidence-based framework for translating the computational
neuroscientiﬁc concepts discussed in this article into a treatment for psychopathy that can be
evaluated for efﬁcacy/tolerability and cost-effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Bayesian model of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing proposes that en-
trenched abnormalities in prior beliefs about the self and abnormalities in the encoding of
precision result in the generation of maladaptive Bayesian inferences about the self. These
inferences manifest as a grandiose self-image and remorseless disregard for the effect of one’s
behavior on others. These inferences are generated because these pathogenic mechanisms
serve a vital function for the patient: They defend against consciously experiencing the deep-
seated feelings of worthlessness and shame arising from the patient’s internal working (or gen-
erative) model of the self, which is rooted in their early adverse attachment experiences. These
traits may reﬂect the patient’s learned and reinforced defensive responses to their traumatic
history of repeatedly being made to feel worthless and shameful in the eyes of others, par-
ticularly their attachment ﬁgures. Although there is a great need for more computational
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and neuroscientiﬁc research to elucidate the details, this Bayesian model of psychopathy is
consistent with the major psychotherapeutic models in the ﬁeld and with existing research
on the neurobiology of psychopathy. Furthermore, we have provided a working quantitative
simulation of this model, which means that, in principle, one could quantify the patholog-
ical prior beliefs underlying psychopathic traits (Schwartenbeck & Friston, 2016). Indeed,
the quantiﬁcation of psychopathology is one of the promises of computational psychiatry
(King-Casas et al., 2008; Kishida, King-Casas, & Montague, 2010; Kishida & Montague, 2012;
Moutoussis, Fearon et al., 2014; Moutoussis, Trujillo-Barreto, El-Deredy, Dolan, & Friston,
2014; Ray, King-Casas, Montague, & Dayan, 2009). Finally, we provided a preliminary de-
scription of the treatment implications of our model through a general overview of a novel
Integrated Modular Treatment for Psychopathy. Though much work still needs to be done, we
hope that this article lays a foundation for integrating cognitive and psychodynamic approaches
with well-established computational frameworks in neuroscience in the hope of bringing the
ﬁeld closer to understanding the etiology, and therefore treatment, of psychopathy.
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